Thomas P Joseph Commission of Inquiry-Marad Communal Distrabances

THOMAS P. JOSEPH COMMISSION OF INQUIRY,
LAKSHADWEEP BUILDING, COURT COMPLEX, KOZHIKODE.

Index
Chapter No. Subject

I Personal

II Parties to the Inquiry

III Preliminary

IV Arguments

V Whether there was lapse on the part of the police/administrative machinery in
taking timely preventive and remedial action and in dealing with the situation

VI The facts and circumstances which led to the incidents at Marad Beach on 2-5-
2003

VII Whether there was involvement of external/internal forces in the planning and
execution of the incidents

VIII Such other matters as are incidental to and arising out of the above terms

IX To suggest suitable measure to avoid such unfortunate incidents in future

X Findings

XI My Gratitude

XII Epilogue

Thomas P. Joseph
Commission of Inquiry

Thomas P. Joseph Commission of Inquiry
Office : Lakshdweep Building, Court Complex,

Kozhikode

Chapter - 1

Personal

Commission : Sri. Thomas P. Joseph

District & Session Judge, Kozhikode
(Formely, District & Sessions Judge, Manjeri)

Counsel : Sri. P. V. Hari., Advocate, Kozhikode

Investigating Officer : Sri. .P. P. Unnikrishnan,

Dy. Supt. Of Police (on Deputation)

Secretary : Sri. K T Chandran

Staff : Sri. P. A. Varghese

(Clerk-cum-Typist)
Sri. K. P. Hussain (Peon)

Thomas P. Joseph
Commission Of Inquiry

CHAPTER - II
PARTIES TO THE INQUIRY PROCEEDINGS

PARTY - A

1. Hindu Aikya Vedi, Kerala, represented by State Organizing Secretary, Sri. M: Radhakrishnan.

2. Marad ArayaSamajam, represented by Secretary,
Sri. T. Suresan.

3. Viswa Hindu Parishad, Kozhikode Khadakom represented by President, Sri. P V Karunakaran,
Agrasala Kshethram, Court Road, Kozhikode.

4. Matsya Pravarthaka Sangham, represented by State Secretary, Sri. N.P Radhakrishnan.

5. Bharathiya Janatha Party District Committee, Kozhikode, represented by. President, Sri. Chettoor
Balakrishnan Master.

6. Rashtriya Sway am Sevak Sangh (R.S.S.) Kerala Khadakom, represented by General
Secretary, Sri. A.R. Mohanan.

7. Sri. G.K. Suresh Babu, Chief Sub Editor, Mathrubhumi
Printing & Publishing Company Ltd, Kollam.

'B' Party No. 14. Sri. K.Alikoya (Kadalundi). 'B' Party No. 15. Sri. Maosa P K. (Keezhseri). 'B' Party No.

1.6. Sri.A. Basheer.

'B' Party No. 17. Sri. K.M. Ashraf.

'B' Party No. 18. Sri. P. Muhammed Haneef. 'B' Party No. 19. Sri. K. Jayarajan.

'B' Panty No. 21 . Sri M.P. Sooiyanarayanan. 'B' Party No. 22. Sri. K.A. Jaleel (Eranakulam). 'B' Party No.

?3. Smt. P. K.Noorbma.

'B' Party No. ?4. Sri. M.T. Sameer. 'B' Party No. 2S. Sri. B.V. M. Rafi. 'B' Party No. 26. Sri. M. Rajan.

'B' Party No. 27. Sri. A.K. Sukumaran. 'B' Party No. 28. Sri. Razal Rahiman. 'C Party (Commission). Sri. P

V. Hari. 'D' Party No. 1. Sri. K.N. Jayakumar.

'E' Party. District Govt. Pleader, Kozhikode. 'F' Party. Sri M. Shahier Singh.

'G' Party. Nil.

'H' Pal-ty No. 1 &2 Sri. P Mohammed Haneef. 'H' Party No. 3 Sri. K. Alikoya (Kadalundi). 'H' Party No. 4

Sri. M. Asokan.

'H' Pant- No. 5 Sri. Subash Benedict. 'H' Party No. 6 Sri. N. Bhaskaran Nair. 'H' Party No. 7 Nil

'H' Party No. 8 District Govt. Pleader, Kozhikode.

CHAPTER III

PRELIMINARY

Marad: A small, Coastal hamlet and fisherfolks' Colony having
dimension at the best 2 sq. k.ms lying within the Beypore Grama
Panchayat limits towards northern side, about 5 k.m. away from Calicut
City, bounded by Kozhikode Corporation area on the north and Arabian
Sea on the west. The place was much talked about in and outside the
State of Kerala during the last few years not because of its scenic beauty
or picturesque sandy beach, not because of the birth/residence of any
Celebrity but, on account of the infamous killings that occurred within
that 2 sq.k.m area on 3/4-1-02 and on 2-5-2003. The first, it is not very
much in dispute, was ultimately a communal clash between the two
predominant communities of the area - the Hindus and the Muslims - in
which five persons-three Muslims and two Hindus had to leave their
terrestrial abode. Twenty one persons were seriously wounded, nearly
fourteen houses were wholly destroyed, thirty five houses were ,
partially damaged or destroyed and twelve fibre boats and one
mechanized boat were destroyed. The Police swung into action and as
many as 115 cases were registered against persons belonging to either
communities. The Police could complete investigation without delay in
large number of those cases but, chargesheets could not be filed due to
the delay in the State Government according sanction for prosecution as,
in those cases. Section 153 A I.P.C. was involved. Consequently, the
accused who were in custody had to be , released on bail. It is while so,
that at about 6.30 p.m. on 2-5-2003, about 90 persons armed with
swords, knives and other weapons reached Marad Beach and started
attacking the unsuspecting Hindus. In that incident, eight persons

Choyichantakath Chandran C Krishnan aged 45/03, Choyichantakath
Madhavan, S/o. Karimbali aged 60/03, Arayachantakath Krishnan, S/o
Unni, aged 43/03, Gopalan, S/o. Choyi, aged 55/03, Dasan, S/o. Sami,
aged 65/03. Thekkethodi Priji, S/o., Babu aged 20/03, Thekkethodi
Santhosh, S/o. Rajan aged 26103 belonging to the Hindu Community,
and Askar Ali, S/o. Aboobacker belonging to the Muslim Community
lost their lives. 16 persons including two women were injured. The
Commissioner of Police, Calicut City and other Police men reached the
place. The Hindus who tried to advance were scared away. The Beypore
Police registered Crime No. 82/03 and started investigation. Same day
night, the Police arrested 63 persons and seized weapons, some of them
even blood stained, from the Marad Juma Masjid. Later, as per the order
of the State Government, the C.B.C.I.D., Kozhikode took up
investigation of the case and on 31-7-2003, filed chargesheet against
148 persons for offences punishable under Sections 120 B, 143, 147,
148, 427, 448, 449, 324, 326, 307, 302, 435 and 153. A read with
Section 34 and 149 LP C, Section 27 (1) of the Arms Act, Sections 3, 4
and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and Sections 3,4 and 9 read with
Section 7 of Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act. The
C.B.C.l.D. after investigation, came to the conclusion that the accused,
in order to avenge the killing of the members of the Muslim Community
on 3/4-1-2002 entered into criminal conspiracy between May, 2002 and
2-5-2003 at various places including the Juma Masjid Mosque, Marad,
made and stored in the Juma Masjid Mosque and it, premises weapons
like country bombs, patrol bombs, flambeau, swords, choppers, spears,
iron pipes etc., attacked the eight persons referred above and other
persons belonging to the Hindu community. In that onslaught, the said
eight persons died while, few other persons were seriously wounded. It
was also the conclusion of the Crime Branch that Askar Ali suffered

fatal injuries while his colleagues inflicted injury on one of the above
said persons. The Hindu organizations in and around Marad were quite
unsatisfied with the investigation conducted .by the Crime Branch as
they thought that internal / external forces are behind the massacre and
demanded investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B.I.).
It is in that background that as per Notification No. 24507/SSA-2/2003/.
Home, dated 23-8-2003 issued by the Principal Secretary to Govt, by the
order of the Governor and in exercise of the power conferred under Sec.
3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 (Central Act 60 of 1952) that
the Government appointed me as the Commission of Inquiry for the
purpose of conducting an inquiry into the incidents that occurred at
Marad Beach, Kozhikode on 2-5-2003. Following that, as per
Notification No. 24507/ SSA2/ 2003/, Home dt. 27-9-2003, the
Government prescribed the trams of reference of the Commission as
follows:

To Inquire into and Report

i. The facts and circumstances which led to the incidents at Marad
Beach, Kozhikode on 2-5-2003 resulting in the death of 9 "persons,
serious injuries to many others and damage to property;

ii. Whether there was involvement of any external or internal
organization or organizations in the planning and execution of the
incidents;

iii. Whether there was any lapse on the part of the police or
administrative machinery in taking timely preventive and remedial
action and in dealing with the situation;

iv. Such other matters as are incidental to and arising out of the above
terms; and;

V. To suggest suitable measures to avoid such unfortunate incidents in
future.

The Commission was directed to complete the inquiry and submit report
within six months (from 27-8-03)

2. Pursuant to the above Notifications, the Commission issued
Notification No. 1/03 on 1-10-2003 and the same was published in all
the vernacular and English Dailies having circulation in the State of
Kerala, inviting written statements from persons/parties/organizations
interested in taking part, in the Inquiry and concerning the terms of
reference stated above - Several /persons/parties/organizations filed
written statements within the said time and the extended time. Of them,
36 persons/parties/organizations appeared before the Commission. The
Civil Administration, Kozhikode and City Police Administration were
impleaded as parties. On the basis of the contentions taken up by those
persons/ parties/organizations concerning the terms of reference and in
particular whether, external / internal forces are involved in the
massacre on 2-05-03, the parties were grouped in the manner stated in
Chapter II.

3. The A parties referred above took up common contention. They
claimed that the Madrassa education given to the Muslim Children is in
such a way as to instill hatred towards other religions. At Marad and
elsewhere in the State, the Muslim fundamentalist/terrorist
organizations were trying to create law and order problems, attack the
Hindus and demolish their places of worship in an attempt to convert.
Kerala State into another Kashmir. The funding for such operations
came from the Hawala transactions. There were conscious attempts
made by the Muslim fundamentalist/ terrorist organisations to scare off
Hindus from the coastal areas north of Trissur in an attempt to convert

that region into another Dubai. Those terrorists / fundamentalist
organisations had close contacts with terrorist organisations which
attempted to assassinate the then Union Home Minister, Sri. L.K.
Adwani. Referring to the first communal riots at Marad on 3/4- I -02,
the A parties claimed that it was the handiwork of CPI (M) which
wanted a strong polarisation of the Hindu and Muslim forces to better
its political ends. CPI (M) was disturbed on a Muslim getting elected
from Marad, to the local panchayat with the help of the Hindus. To
thwart any such possible alliance in future, CPI (M) wanted to divide
the Hindus and Muslims and taking capital out of a small incident that
occurred during the New Year celebrations in December, 2001, the CPI
(M) indulged in large scale violence which resulted in the first
communal riot on 3/4-1-02. Following that incident, the State
Government did not take proper action. There was inordinate delay in
filing the charge sheets. The State Government took up a policy of
appeasing the Muslim fundamentalists / terrorists at the instance of the
lUML. On 2-5-03, the Muslim fundamentalists / terrorists armed with
deadly weapons made an onslaught on the Hindus leaving eight of them
dead and several persons injured. The fundamentalist / terrorist
organizations like the NDF are behind the incident. They are funded by
foreign elements. The Indian Union Muslim League assisted those
fundamentalist/terrorist organizations. The Police was quite inactive at
Marad, and was only providing convenience to the communal elements
to attack the Hindus. It is also contended that the District
Administration and the Police Administration, Kozhikode thoroughly
failed in anticipating possible violence at Marad and acting upon
whatever information the Intelligence Unit had collected. The then
District Collector, Sri. T. O. Sooraj was communal in his activities. The

A Parties claimed that the Muslim places of worship are misused for
fundamentalist / terrorist activities.

4. The Muslim organizations, the lUML and its units among the B
parties referred above, generally contended that the massacre on 2-5-03
was only a retaliation for the killing of the Muslims during the first
communal riot on 3/4-1-02. They 'claimed that .Aboobacker who was
very popular among the Muslims of the area and who was going to dig
the grave-yard for the Muslim brothren killed on 3-1-02 was attacked
and killed by the Hindu fundamentalists in the presence of the Police on
4-1-02. That incident wounded the mind of many in the Muslim
community and they avenged .the killing of Aboobacker. They
contented that the first communal riot was engineered by the BJP / RSS
and the CPI (M) for political gains. The lUML and its units saw the
hand of the CPl(M) in the massacre on 2-5-2003 also. The B party Nos
2 and 3 denied that the NDF had any role in any of the incidents at
Marad. Instead, the Araya Samajam and the RSS were promoting illwill
among their ranks against other communities. The ArayaSamajam and
the RSS leaders were engaged in very provocative talks. Marad became
tense only after the RSS secured foot-hold there, in 1956 and was
successful in converting the ignorant fishermen into their discipline.
Since then, the communal harmony and peaceful co-existence ceased at
Marad. They referred to the role of the RSS in various communal riots
in the State and elsewhere. They claimed that the NDF was formed on
14-11-1993 with the lawful and laudable objectives narrated in their
written statement.

5. Such other B parties who are either the CPI (M) or its organisations /
Units / claimed that the incidents during 3/4- 1 -02 and 2-5-03 were the
result of the communal appeasement policy adopted by the UDF led by

10

the Congress Party which ruled the State from 2001 onwards. The
BJP/RSS and lUML are involved in those incidents. They claimed that
UDF came to power with the assistance of the fundamentalists /
terrorists organisations. Those organisations took advantage of the UDF
rule. They also alleged that the Government machinery was quite
inactive and that resulted in the incident on 3/4-1-02 and 2-O5-03.
According to them, the NDF was behind the massacre on 2-5-2003.

6. The statement of E party is field by sri. T.O. Sooraj, the then District
Collector. He referred to the incidents which occurred on 3/4-1-02, the
various measures taken by the Civil Administration for restoration and
maintenance of peace at Marad and for rehabilitation. The incident on 2-
5-03 was in retaliation of the murder of Aboobacker, killed on 4-O1-02,
The massacre on 2-O5-03 was carried out by the radical Muslims
including the relatives of Aboobacker who were keen to avenge the
killing of Aboobacker. Following the incident on 2-5-03 also, the
District Administration plunged into action. The statement referred to
the various steps taken by the District Administration and claimed that
there was absolutely no lapse on the part of the Civil Administration in
taking timely preventive and remedial action and in dealing with the
situation and that it was due to the timely action taken by the Civil
Administration that the graveness of the incident was limited and the
entire situation could be controlled.

7. The Police Administration, Kozhikode (F Party) is represented by the
Commissioner of Police, Kozhikode City. The statement on behalf of
the F party is submitted by Sri. T.K. Vinod Kumar, Commissioner of
Kozhikode City. The Police Administration referred to the incidents at
Marad right from 1954 onwards which resulted in communal division
and clashes. The statement refers to the action taken by the Police in

11

those incidents. There is reference to the local body election on 27-9-00
in which, Moideenkoya (he is an accused in crime No. 82/0 3 of
Beypore Police Station) won the election from ward No. 20 (which takes
in Marad) of Beypore Panchayat. It is stated that Moideenkoya won the
election with the support of BJP/RSS. A minor incident that occurred
during the New Year celebrations in December, 2001 grew into clash
between the two communities on 3/4-1-02 in which, few persons from
both communities lost their lives. The Police registered cases against all
the culprits and the accused were arrested. Special investigation team
was constituted for investigation for those cases. 'Kadalkodathi' was
formed at Marad to settle minor disputes that arose between the
members of the two communities. Kadalkodathi met on several
occasions and settled minor disputes. Thus, all possible steps were taken
by the Police to maintain and restore peace in the locality. It is while so,
that a group of Muslims attacked the members of Hindu Araya Samajam
Community on 2-5-03. The assailants gathered in the Marad Juma
Masjid, formed into two groups and attacked some unsuspecting Hindu
men. In that incident, 8 (eight) Hindus were killed. A Muslim by name
Askar, was also killed. The Police forces reached the spot immediately
and took steps for restoration and maintenance of peace. Cases were
registered against the assailants. The F party contended that there was
absolutely no lapse on part of the Police in taking timely preventive and
remedial action and in dealing with the situation. The F party also
contended that but for such timely action, the graveness of the incident
would have been unlimited.

8. The grievance of the G party is that the compensation awarded by the
State Government is low.

12

9. The 'E' Party, Kozhikode District Civil Administration started
evidence. It examined the then District Collector, Sri. T.O. Sooraj.
Thereafter, it was the turn of the 'F' party, the City Police
Administration. In the meantime, orders were issued to the State and
Central Intelligence wings to cause production of certain intelligence
reports. The orders were challenged by the State / Central Intelligence
Departments before the Hon'ble High Court. There was a stay of
disclosure of the intelligence reports. On account of that, the witnesses
for the 'F' party could not be examined. In the meantime, the 'A'
Parties were directed to adduce their evidence and accordingly, 'A'
parties examined their witnesses. By this time, the Hon'ble High Court
disposed of the writ proceedings and in consequence, the Central
Intelligence Wing also produced some intelligence reports. Thereafter,
the ' F' party examined its witnesses. At that stage, on 24-6-2005 after
giving prior notice, I heard the counsel/ parties on the question of
according status under section 8 B the Act on persons/parties/
organizations. After hearing , them, order was passed on 1-7-2005 that
status under section 8 B is accorded to the following persons/
parties/organizations

Persons/ Parties /

The matter in relation to which notice is issued.

Organizations to which notice

Regarding their alleged involvment in the

is issued

communal riot at Marad on3/4 - 1-2002 which is

1 . The Bharathiya Janatha

alleged to be one of the circumstances that led to

Party (A party No. 5)

the massacre at Marad on 2-5-2003

District Committee,

Kozhikode represented

by its president.

2. Rashitriya Sway am

Sevak Sangh (A party

No 6) State Committee

Emakulam represented

by its General

Secretary.

13

3 . The communist Party
of India (Marxist) 'B'
Party No. 4 Beypore
Local Committee
represented by its
Secretary.

4. The Communist Party
of India (Marxist) (B
Party No. 19) District
Committee, Kozhikode,
represented by its
Secretary

Regarding their alleged efforts at Marad and
premises to create communal divide among
communal divide among the Muslims and
Hindus for political gains and regarding their
alleged and regarding their alleged involment in
the communal riot at Marad, on 3/4 -1-2002
which is alleged to be one of the circumstances
that led to the massacre at Marad on 2-5-2003

5. The Indian Union
Muslim League
Committee (B Party)
No. 15) Beypore
Consistuency,
represented by its
General Secretary.

6. Indian Union Muslim
League District
Committee (B Party
No. 18) represented by
its secretary.

Regarding their alleged involment in the
communal riot at Marad on 3/4-1-2002 which is
alleged to be one of the circumstances that led to
the massacre on 2-5-2003 and their alleged
cormivance with forces behind the massacre on
2-5-03, for the commission of that crime.

7. a) The Mahal

Committee Marad Juma
Masjid.

b) Sri. Mayin Haji, S/o
Kunhali, Chemvarmur,
Kozhikode, (Calicut
Development
Authority)

c) P. P. Moideenkoya
(Accused No. 141) S/o
Abdurahiman,
Pareechintakath Veedu,
Neermoochil Paramb,
Beypore amsom,
Marad, (Member of
Ward No. 20

Regarding their alleged connivance with the
forces behind the massacre on 2-5-2003 for the
commission of that crime.

8. The National

Development Front (B
Party No 2 ) State

Regarding their alleged activities intended at
communal divide at Marad and premises and
alleged involvment in the communal riot at

14

Committee, kozhikode
represented by its
General Secretary

Marad on 3/4 -1-2003 and in the massacre on 2-
5-2003

9. The District civil
Administration (F Party
No. 1 ) represented by
District Collector,
Kozhikode

10. The City Police
Administration (F Party
Nol) represented by
the Commissioner of
PoHce CaHcut City.

Regarding their alleged failure to assess the tense
and violent situation at Marad before the
massacre on 2-5-2003 and their alleged failure to
take effective and timely action to prevent
violence at Marad.

ll.a)Sri. TOSooraj,
Former District
Collector, Kohikode
b) Sri. Sanjeev Kumar
Patjoshi, Former
Commissioner of
PoHce, CaHcut City

Regarding their alleged failure toassess the tense
and violent situation at Marad following the
communal riots on 3/4 -1-2 — 2002, alleged
failure to take fimely and effective preventive
action, inept handling of the situation at Marad
and their alleged failure to act in co-ordination
which ultimately helped the perperators of the
massacre on 2-5-2003

12. Sri. M. Abdul Raheem
Former Asst.
Commisoner of Police
(South) Kohikode

Regarding his alleged cormviance with the forces
behind the massacre on 2-5-2003 for the
commission of that crime.

13. Sri. Mahesh Kumar
Singla, Inspector
General of Police
(crime) Trivandrum

Regarding his alleged refusal/failure to
investigate into the alleged invohnent of
external/internal forces behind the massacre at
Marad on 2-5-2003 inspite of the free hand given
to him by the State Government to investigate
into "all aspects leading to the massacre" and his
alleged attempt to make it appear that there were
no such forces involved in the massacre.

14. The Home Secretary,
Government of Kerala

Regarding the alleged failure of the Home
Department to grant sanction for prosecution of
the accused involved in the communal riots at
Marad on 3/4-1-2002 in time, which is alleged to
have contributed to the massacre on 2-5-2003
and the alleged inaction on the part of the Home
Department and successive Governments after
1996 to effectively act upon the various
intellegence/PoHce reports concemings alleged

15

activities of the fundamentalists/terroist of groups
in Marad and other parts of the State, to curb
such activities which allegedly contributed to the
massacre at Marad on 2-5-2003

10. The above persons/Parties /organizations were given notice that they can (if
not already) be represented by a counsel before the Commission, produce then-
evidence if any, in their defence and exercise the right confered on them under the
relevant provisions of the Commission on Inquiry Act and that they should, for the
said purpose, appear before the Commission at 1 1 am on 15-7-2005.

11. On 15-7-2005, all the above 14 parties/organizations/persons having
received the notices issued to them u/s. 8B of the Act appeared before
the Commission. All those parties/organizations / persons other than
who are already impleaded in the proceedings as parties, were grouped
for convenience as H parties 1 to 8. Almost all the persons/ parties /
organisations / to whom notice under S.8B was issued, filed their
explantion. The parties were given full opportunity to adduce their
evidence. Altogether, 121 witnesses were examined and 622 documents
were marked in evidence. The gist of the evidence of 'the witnesses is
given in volume II. I will be referring to the evidence in detail in the
following Chapters while considering the various points involved in the
Inquiry. After the entire evidence was recorded, I heard the counsel for
the parties.

Thomas P. Joseph

Commission OF INQUIRY

16

CHAPTER-IV

ARGUMENTS

The Counsel for the A parties argued that the BJP/RSS activists had no
role in the communal riot at Marad Beach on 3/4-1-2002. The massacre
at Marad Beach on 2-5-2003 was not merely a retaliation for the killing
of Aboobacker, Yunus and Kunhikoya during the communal riot at
Marad Beach on 3/4-1-2002. The learned counsel, referring to the oral

17

and documentary evidence produced before 'the Commission submitted
that what happened on 2-5-2003 was part of secret agenda of certain
Muslim fundamentalist and terrorist organizations with the backing of
external forces like the I.S.I, to wipe out the Hindu community from the
coastal areas of the State. He submitted that the N.D.F. and the Al-
Umma of Tamil Nadu are directly involved in the massacre on 2-5-2003.
The attempt of the assailants as revealed from the evidence was to kill
maximum number of the members of the Hindu community within the
shortest possible time. According to learned counsel, the large quantity
of weapons collected in and around the Juma Masjid Mosque at Marad
Beach indicated that. According to learned counsel, the Civil / City
Police Administrations failed in taking timely preventive and remedial
action to prevent the massacre on 2-5-2003. The conduct of the then
District Collector , Sri. T.O. Suraj is very doubtful. The very
appointment of FW-2 (H party No. 6), Sri. Abdul Rahim as the Assistant
Commissioner, South Sub Division, Kozhikode is suspicious. According
to learned counsel, evidence revealed that the N.D.F. was exerting
influence on FW-2 through Sri. A. A. Wahab. It is further contended that
AW- 12, Sri. P.K. Kunhalikkutty and AW-3, Sri. Mayin Haji (H Pary No.
3) had prior information about the massacre on 2-5-2003. According to
the Id. counsel, the then District Collector (EWI) and the Commissioner
of Police, Kozhikode, (AW32) are responsible for the failure of the
Civil/ City Police Administrations.

2. The counsel for B party Nos. 2 ad 3 contended that there is no
evidence, except certain police reports and intelligence reports which
itself cannot be taken into account, to show that the N.D.F. is in any
way involved in the communal riot on 3/4-1-2002 or the massacre on 2-
5-2003. There is no evidence to show that any of the accused involved
in those incidents are in any way connected with the NDF The Id

Counsel submitted that the CBCID had conducted thorough
investigation but no involvement of the NDF was revealed. According to
learned counsel, the N.D.F. as proved by Exits. B99 to 109 is a socio-
charitable organization and was unnecessarily dragged into the picture
by the Hindu organizations as part of their hate ideology. The Id.
Counsel complained that the media was uncharitable in their propaganda
against the NDF. He referred to instances where, the media had to ,
withdraw their statements against the NDF and tender apology. He also
referred to the evidence of BW7 and BW 8 and Exits. B 146 to B 149 to
show to what extend the media has gone against the NDF. Learned
counsel submitted that the whole trouble arose due to the hate ideology
and annihilation programme of the SanghParivar outfits. He placed
reliance on Exts. B9 (a), B 15, B 16(a), B24 to B 29, B 31 to B34 and
Exts. B 111 to B 139 as also evidence of BW-16 and BW-I7 to show
that SanghParivar is engaged in violence everywhere in the Country.
Ext. B 123 according to learned counsel, revealed that the SanghParivar
was involved in 75 atrocities against minorities across the country.
Exts. 120 and 121 revealed that the SanghParivar was getting foreign
funds. Exts.B 113 and B 117 revealed that the SanghParivar was giving
training in arms to its cadres and engaging in terrorist activities. Ext. B
30 contained reports of Judicial Commissions which condemned the
activities of the SanghParivar. According to learned counsel, evidence
revealed that there were communal activities in and around Marad
atleast from 1954 onwards. It is in such a situation that three Muslims
were killed on 3/4-1-2002. The learned counsel submitted that the
relatives and close associates of Aboobacker, killed on 4-1-2002 were
instrumental in the massacre on 2-5-2003. It is further contended from
the production of copy of police report by AW7 and the details of
intelligence I reports provided by witnesses for A parties that the

19

SanghParivar has close connection with the intelligence wing. Thus, the
possibility of the SanghParivar agents giving false information to the
Police cannot be ruled out.

3. The counsel for B party Nos 4,5,19,20 contended that communal
violence erupted at Marad Beach ever since a group of Hindus migrated
to that place from Tanur. According to the learned counsel, the R.S.S.
activists inaugurated the killing spree in Beypore Panchayath in the
year, 1988. That was followed by the lUML activists killing one
Ramesan in the year, 1989. Those incidents triggered communal riots at
different places of Beypore panchayath. The learned counsel claimed
that the CPI(M) and its local units always stood for secularism. It is not
true that the CPI (M) activists are involved in the communal riot during
3/4-1-2002 or the massacre on 2-5-2003.

4. The counsel for B party Nos 5,6,14, I 8 and H party Nos. 1 to 3
argued that there is no evidence worth the name to show that the lUML
activists are involved either in the incidents during 3/4- 1 -2002 or on 2-
5-2003. At any rate, there is no evidence to show that the I.U.M.L. as an
organization is behind those incidents. According to learned counsel,
there is no necessity or occasion to make any adverse comments on H
party Nos. 1 to 3

5. The counsel for E party and H party No. 8 referred to the various
steps taken by the Civil Administration for restoration of peace in the
locality after the communal riot on 3/4-1-2002. According to learned
counsel, the Civil Administration had taken all necessary steps to
prevent further violence.

6. Counsel for F party also referred to the various steps taken by the
City Police Administration to prevent violence at Marad Beach.

20

According to learned counsel, all possible action has been taken by the
Police. He referred to the various oral and documentary evidence
produced by the F party. Counsel for H party No. 4 (EW-1 ) submitted
that there is no evidence to show that intelligence reports now relied by
AW-30 were given to the H party No. 4. According to learned counsel,
Ext. H 9 revealed that no such information was given by the intelligence
wing. He also argued that since the allegation of corruption made
against H party No. 4 is under enquiry by the Lok Ayuktha, Commission
is not to make any finding on that issue and at any rate, that allegation
has nothing to do with the terms of reference. It is the further contention
of the learned counsel that the mere inclusion of certain persons in the
kadavu committee as per the recommendation of the lUML is not
sufficient to show that H party No. 4 was communal in his activities.
The learned counsel wanted the Commission to refer to the confidential
affidavit filed by H party No. 4. Counsel for Aw-32 (H party No. 5)
contended that AW-32 was discriminated by AW29 According to
learned counsel, notice under sec. 8 B of the Act was served on Aw 32
(H party No. 5) merely on the basis of shabbi evidence let in by AW29
who was out to spoil the future of AW32. No adverse observation be
made against AW32 for what transpired after he handed over charge as
Commissioner of police, Calicut on 19-3-2003. .

7. The counsel for the Commission submitted that Ext. C 17, the report
prepared by the District Special Branch, Kozhiode unit in 1998 about 4
years before the communal riots on 3/4-1-02 cannot be ignored. He
submitted that though under the provisions of the Kerala Police Manual
(Amendment No. 2/1976), the police was to take firm action against
persons who acted in a manner likely to create illwill, hatred etc.
between different communities and though the Police could not ignore
any case even if trivial in that line, the Police did not comply with those

21

provisions. The provisions of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of
Misuse) Act, 1988 were not complied. As regards the investigation into
the alleged involvement of other forces behind the massacre on 2-52003,
the learned counsel submitted that since the C.B.C.I.D. had not
conducted any investigation into that matter and since at any rate, the
alleged conspiracy involving other forces is separate from the
conspiracy among the 148 accused in Crime 82/2003 of Beypore Police
station (Crime 116 / Cr/ 2003 of C.B.C.I.D.), sec. 173 (8) of the Code of
Criminal procedure had no application. He placed reliance on the
decisions in Ramlal Narang vs. State (Delhi Admn.) (1979 Cri. L.J.
1346), Sri. Bhagvan Samardha Sree Pada Vallabha Vs. State of Andrha
Pradesh (1999(6) Supreme 47) and Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi vs. State
of Gujarat (2004 (3) Supreme 71).

8. 1 have gone through all relevant evidence. I considered the arguments
advanced. Now, I shall refer to each of the terms of reference, the
evidence collected - and other circumstances brought out before the
Commission.

THOMAS P. JOSEPH

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

22

CHAPTER -V

WHETHER, THERE WAS ANY LAPSE ON THE PART OF THE

POLICE OR ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY IN TAKING

TIMELY PREVENTIVE AND REMEDIAL ACTION AND IN

DEALING WITH THE SITUATION"

I am required to inquire into whether, there was failure on the part of
the Civil / Police Administration in taking timely action to prevent the
massacre on 2/5/2003 and in dealing with the situation. During 3/4-1-
2002, there was communal riot at Marad Beach in which 2 persons from
the Hindu Community and 3 persons from the Muslim Community died,
several others suffered injuries and several houses were torched or
otherwise destroyed. Going by Ext. S 13 series and other evidence, the
communal riot during .3/4-1-2002 originated from a very insignificant
and trivial incident which occurred in a cultural programme arranged by
Alliance Club at Sagarasarani, Marad Beach as part of its New Year
Programme on 31- i 2-'?001 . In the course of the dance programme,
one Sujith aged about 18 years allegedly had an altercation with one
Sakeer following the former's foot falling on the latter' s foot. That
dispute was almost settled. On 1-1-2002, there was wordy altercation at
Marad Beach between Sujith and Sakeer. That issue was almost settled
between two families. At about 7 PM on 3-1-2002 Sujith allegedly
assaulted by Sakeer. At about 7.15 PM. some Hindu men, learning about
that incident obstructed Sakeer and questioned him. Learning that, the

23

friends and relatives of Sakeer came to the spot and there was some
tussle. In the meantime, some vested interests had spread the canard that
in the dance programme on 31-12-2001, a Hindu boy had insulted a
Muslim girl. Rumour spread that a communal clash occurred at Marad
Beach. At about 7.20 P.M. on 3-1-2002, each side attacked the other
using deadly weapons like swords, chopper, stick etc. At about 7.45
P.M., Thekkethodi Suresan and others attacked and killed Kunhikoya.
At about 8.10 P.M., Prabhu and others attacked and killed Yunus. At
about 8.10 P.M., Latheef and others attacked the house of Pushparajan,
an R.S.S. worker (he was later murdered, allegedly by C.P.I.M activists)
in their attempt to kill Pushparajan and killed his nephew, Shinjith. It is
said that Pushparajan though, was available in that house at the time of
attack, saved himself by hiding in the water tank. At about 8.20 P.M.
Ashraf and others attacked and killed Kunhimon. The District Collector,
Kozhikode issued prohibitory orders within Beypore Police station
limits u/s. 144 Cr.P.C. for two days from 12 A.M. on 4-1-2002. At about
8 A.M. on 4-1-2002, allegedly in the presence of Police, Thekkethodi
Suresan and others killed Aboobacker who is said to have been very
popular among the Muslim community. In the meantime, several houses
were attacked and several fell injured. Following those incidents, there
were peace initiatives from the side of the Civil Administration,
Kozhikode and as directed by the State Government, peace committees
were formed. The police also swung into action. A KadaKodathi (se
asc'l) was formed with ' the Assistant . Commissioner of Police (South
Sub Division), Kozhikode on the chair. Elders from both the
communities were members of that KadaKodathi. It is said that minor
problems which arose between the two communities were being settled
in that KadalKodathi. Policemen were deployed at Marad. A Control
Room was opened at Marad Beach. Nine (9) Police pickets were opened

24

in the area. It is while so, that ' the massacre occurred at Marad Beach
at about 6.15 PM. on 2-5-2003. A group of about 90 Muslims armed
with deadly weapons are said to have come to Marad Beach and
attacked the unsuspecting Hindu men. In that incident, 8 Hindus were
killed. Askar, who is said to have been one of the assailants is said to
have sustained injuries from his co-assailants. He also succumbed to the
injuries. Thus, the total tally rose to . 9. Several others sustained
injuries. Learning about the incident, the Sub Inspector of Police,
Beypore and party reached the spot; followed by Sri. T. K. VinodKumar
(FW. 6), the then Commissioner of Police, Calicut and his men. It is
said that learning about the attack, about 200 Hindus collected weapons
and proceeded to the scene of occurrence. They were prevented by the
Commissioner (FW 6) and party and at one point of time, the
Commissioner had to fire few rounds in the air to disperse them.
Learning that some of the assailants have taken assylum in the Juma
Masjid at Marad Beach, the police party tried to enter the Mosque. They
were obstructed by the Muslim women who surrounded the Mosque.
Ultimately, the police made their entry into the compound and the
Mosque, some Muslim men who are said to have taken part in the
massacre and wearing blood stained clothes and weapons were arrested
on the spot. The Police is also said to have seized about 90 country
bombs, 40 swords, knives and other weapons from the. Mosque. The
Beypore Police registered Crime No. 82/03 and started - investigation.
The investigation was later entrusted to the Crime Branch C.I.D.Unit,
Kozhikode. They re-registered the case as Crime No. lI6/03/Cr. The
Crime Branch investigation team was lead by Sri. T.V. Kamalakshan,
Superintendent of Police, (AW 19). The investigation was supervised by
the Inspector General of Police, Sri. Maheshkumar Singla (AW35). The
Crime Branch Police, after investigation filed chargesheet arraying 148

25

accused, in the J.F.M.C-V, Kozhikode on 31-7-2003. (Ext. C9 is the C.C
. of chargesheet and Ext. CIO, C.C. of a memo of evidence prepared by
the Crime Branch C.I.D. Unit). That case is now under trial in the Court
of the Special Judge (Marad Cases), Kozhikode.

2. Following the massacre at Marad Beach on 2-52003, several Muslim
families fled from the Beach and they were accommodated in the relief
camps opened by the Civil Administration. There was demand for their
rehabilitation. The Hindu organizations refused to co-operate with the
rehabilitation programmes unless, the State Government ordered
investigation by the C.B.I into the massacre and the alleged involvement
of external/ internal forces behind the massacre. The office bearers of
the Kozhikode Press Club and others tried to mediate. In the mediation
talks initiated by the Gandhi Peace Foundation, an understanding was
reached between the Hindu organizations and the State Government.
Consequently, rehabilitation process started on 10-10-2003 and that was
completed by 24-10-2003. reports say that 285 displaced families were
rehabilitated. That included 280 Muslim families, 4 Hindu families and
one Christian family. That involved a total of 1320 persons - 308 males,
-588 females and 424 children. The police operations following the '
massacre on 2-5-2003 was led by the commissioner of police, Sri. T. K.
VinodKumar and assisted by his subordinates including the Assistant
Commissioner (South Sub Division), Sri. Abdul Rahim. As regards the
performance of police after 'the massacre on 2-5-2003 in the matter of
prevention of spreading violence, there is no serious case for any of the
parries before the Commission that there was any failure. Almost all the
Political parties who are represented before the Commission were
unanimous in their opinion that the police acted swiftly and efficiently
to prevent the spreading of violence after the massacre on 2-5-2003. The
main dispute is on the question whether, the Civil/ Police

26

Administration failed in anticipating the massacre and taking timely,
preventive and remedial action. To decide that, it is necessary to go into
the question whether, the Intelligence wing had collected sufficient
information regarding the possible violence at Marad Beach after the
first communal riot and before the massacre on 2-5-2003 and whether
that information was passed on to the Civil/ Police Administration.

3. Before going deep into that issue, it is necessary to decide whether
the Intelligence reports produced by the Intelligence Wing can be used
in evidence by this Commission. The Commission had vide. Order dated
291-2004 held that the State Police is not entitled to claim privilege in
respect of those documents us. 123 or 1?4 of the Evidence Act. The
secret documents were marked for reference as Ext.S series. That order
was challenged in the Hon'ble High Court in W.P. (C) No. 5006/04. 'The
Hon'ble High Court ultimately directed, while disposing of the Writ
Petition and W.A. No. 628/04 that the Commission is to decide the issue
and if ultimately, it is found that those documents are entitled to the
privilege under Sections 123 or 124 of the Evidence Act, the
Commission cannot refer to such documents. Accordingly, I considered
the issue. Since the documents produced by the Central Intelligence
Bureau were not required, those documents (marked for reference as
Ext.S 19) were deleted from the item of evidence. Notice was issued to
the Additional Director General of Police (Intelligence), Trivandrum
and the Commissioner of Police, Kozhikode. They filed affidavits
claiming privilege. The relevant documents were perused by the
Commission in the Chamber in camera, in the presence of those officers.
As per order dated 2611-2005, the Commission overruled the objection
of the said Officers and held that Ext. S6 to S 18 (Ext. S 1 to S5 are not
secret documents in respect of which privilege was claimed) are not

27

entitled to the privilege u/s.l23 or 124 of the Evidence Act. Hence,
those documents will be made use of by the Commission.

4. BWI is the local M.L.A., Sri. V.K.C. Mammad Koya. He had visited
Marad Beach several times after the 2002 and 2003 incidents. His
evidence is that mostly, people of Marad Beach are fishermen. Only
very few have ' higher education (beyond the 10th standard). The
average . ' education is less than S.S.L.C. Nobody is employed in the
Government or private institutions. Their financial condition is very
poor. After the first communal riot on 3/4-1-2002, a meeting was
convened in the Beypore panchayat Office on 5-1-2002. That was
attended by officials and the leaders of various political parties. A
Committee was formed with the District Collector as Chairman and the
Revenue Divisional Officer (R.D.O.) as the Convener. The Committee
initiated some steps to bring about peace in the area. Relief camps were
opened by' the Arayasamajam for the Hindus and the Mahal Committee,
for the Muslims. The C.P.I.(M) opened, in the words of the witness a
secular relief camp in the house of one of its activists, Balaraman
(BW2). Sri.V.K.C.Mammed Koya claimed that on his visit to Marad
Beach after the first communal riot, he understood the possibility of
further violence there, at any time. There were wide spread rumours that
another attack is imminent. The Police action had to be strengthened. He
addressed letter to the . Chief Minister to that effect on 12.6.2002. Ext.
B80 is the copy of that letter. The Chief Minister gave him an
acknowledgment for that letter, as per Ext.BSl dated 19-6-2002. He was
informed that the matter is being looked into. Again, he sent another
letter dated 28-1-2003 (Ext.B82) to the Chief Minister informing the
latter that another communal riot might take place at Marad Beach at
any , point of time. The witness claimed that he had talked - to the then
District Collector (EWI ) and Commissioner of Police Kozhikode

28

(AW32) about that possibility. Ext. XII , is the copy of the proceeding
of the , State Legislative Assembly on 16-7-2002. It is revealed from
Ext. XII that B W 1 had raised questions about the Police action at
Marad Beach, what action was taken to prevent recurrence of violence
and he was told by the Chief Minister (DWI), about the action taken so
far. In answer to the query as to what was the stage of the watch tower
to be constructed for the Police at Marad Beach, the Chief Minister
replied that Rs. 1 lakh sanctioned for the purpose. Ext.X12 is the
proceedings of the Assembly on 28-1-2003. It is stated therein, that
administrative sanction was granted for Rs. 6,34,000/- for purchasing
materials for watch tower but, no fund was allocated for that. The
M.L.A. was informed that action will be taken subject to the availability
of funds. It is the further version of the witness that there were
communal clashes at different places of Beypore constituency , ..
(Marad Beach comes in that constituency) following the demolition of
Babri Masjid. The witness referred to certain instances of such violence
on the anniversary of that incident on 6-12-2001 as well, and how the
police failed to tackle the issue. Ext.A84 (a) is the report in the New
Indian Express dated '16-7-2004. Vice Admiral Sri. Sureesh Metah is
reported to have said that a Coast Guard Station is to be set up in
Beypore in March, 2005, few acre of land is identified for the purpose
and that the Coast Guard Station can be set up, if the State Government
Handed over the land. He is also reported to have said that the Beypore
Coast Guard Station will plug the entry points in Malabar region for
sneaking in weapons and explosives by the terrorists and that '
Kozhikode' is the hub of such activities, earlier it was drug trafficking
and now, ammunition is also being smuggled in. Ext. ASS (a) and A86
(a) are similar reports in 'Malayala Manorama' and 'Mathrubhumi'
dailes dated 16-7-2004 containing the same report. BW2 is a C.P.I.(M)

29

activist and resident of Beypore Panchayat. BW3 was president of
Beypore Grama .Panchayat during 2000-2005. They referred to the
communal clashes at Marad Beach and other places within Beypore
Panchayat limits since 1954. They also referred to the political murders
the place saw since 1993.

5. DW I is Sri. A. K.Antony, the Chief Minister of ' the State during the
relevant time. He conceded that BWl had told him that the Police
should be more vigilant at Marad Beach. According to him, the
massacre on 2-5-2003 was an unparalleled incident.

6. AW6, Sri. T. Suresh, the then Secretary of the Arayasamajam and
resident of Marad stated that following the communal riot on 3/4-1-
2002, the fundamentalists/ terrorists/extremist elements, aided and
instigated by the N.D.F. were making preparations for another round of
attack on the Hindus. ' They were collecting weapons and stockpiling
the same in and around Marad Beach. He referred to the deliberations in
the 'Kadalkodathi' convened by the then Assistant Commissioner,
(South), Sri. Abdul Rahim and claimed that in the meeting of the
Kadalkodathi' held on 22-3-2003, getting information about the wordy
altercation between two groups of Muslims after the Juma prayer in the
Marad Mosque on the issue whether the Muslims should retaliate, they
had informed the 'Kadalkodathi' chaired by the then assistant
Commissioner (South), Sri. Abdul Rahim about that incident and the
possibility of violence. The Assistant Commissioner (South) however,
pacified them saying that on enquiry, that information was found to be
baseless and hence, the Hindus should not believe that and other like
rumours. According to the witness, the police did not seriously take into
account their complaint about the possible violence. AWS is Noufal, a
resident of Marad. On 4-42003, he saw a wordy altercation between two

30

groups of Muslims near the Juma Masjid at Marad, within its compound.
He heard a person asking whether, they should not live in the southern
side of ' Marad (where, there is Hindu congregation). According to the
witness, that was a wordy altercation on the question of making
violence at Marad. He asked the local C.P.I.(M) leader, Ponnath
Peethambaran to take up the matter with the local M.L.A. (BWl ) and
others and do something in the matter.

7. AW27, the Assistant Sub Inspector in the Kozhikode District Special
Branch Unit during the relevant time, claimed that had reported to the
Assistant Commissioner, District Special Branch (hereinafter referred as
D.S.B.) after the first communal riot at Marad on 3/4-1-2002 and before
the massacre on 2-5-2003 that there was the possibility of violence
again at Marad. Whenever any incident occurred at Marad, he used to
report to his He had reported that there was possibility of violence. He
noticed that one of the picket posts at Marad was opened in the house of
one Rukkubi. The wireless set was installed in that picket post. The
witness realised that it was dangerous to keep the wireless set in that
picket post since there was the possibility of information being leaked
out through the inmates of the house and hence, made a strong
suggestion that the picket post or atleast, the wireless set be removed
from that house. Nothing was done on that report until the massacre on
2-5-2003. AW28 also had reported several times that the Police strength
at Marad had to be stepped up. He had reported about the stockpiling of
weapons at Marad after the first communal riot and before 2-5-2003.

8. AW30 was the Dy.S.P, State Special Branch, Kozhikode unit during
the relevant time. Beypore police station came under that unit. He
claimed that his field staff had given reports to, him that the situation at
Mard was not at ' all normal. He had received reports about the

31

possibility of retaliation by the sons and relatives of Aboobacker who
was killed at Marad on 4-1-2002. He received report that Bijili,
S/o. Aboobacker is being assisted and instigated by fundamentalists /
terrorists elements like the N.D.F. and the P.D.P to wreck vengeance on
the Hindus. He conveyed the information to the Intelligence Head
Quarters. The witness had attended all the meetings of Communal
Harmony convened by EW 1, the then District Collector, Kozhikode
(Sri.T.O.Suraj). In such meetings also; he had reported the dangerous
situation at Marad and sought action. Thus, the then District Collector.
Sri.T.O.Suraj was informed and he was aware about the possibility of
violence at Marad. According to the witness, the Communal Harmony
Meetings were ,not effective and there were no serious deliberations , in
those meetings. The witness filed an affidavit (attached to his
deposition) stating that on one occasion, the Communal Harmony
Meeting was held simultaneously with the meeting of Malabar
Mahotsava Committee (to indicate that the meeting of Communal
Harmony was only a farce). He had given reports to the Police that the
Police strength at Marad had to be increased. But what happened was
that the Police strength was being ' reduced step by step, after January,
2003. The Intelligence Wing of the State Police department had never
reported that the situation at Marad was normal so that. Police strength
could be reduced. He claimed that reports were received from the field
staff about collection and stockpiling of weapons at Marad. Both side
were collecting weapons. Mostly, the collection of weapons was in the
Muslim dominated area of Marad. He wanted the local police to initiate
immediate action. Ext.S 13 (a) is the report dated 12-2-2002 about the
collection of weapons at Marad. Copy of that report was given to the
Commissioner of Police, Kozhikode for immediate action. Ext.S 13 (b)
is another report dated 169-2002 to the Commissioner of 'Police,

32

Kozhikode about the collection of weapons wherein, even the place of
storage of weapons was mentioned. That report accompanied by a site
plan of the area where the weapons were planted. The witness claimed
that the local Police took the report casually, neglected it, there was no
effective search for the weapons and instead, a search for namesake
was conducted. Instead of effectively searching the stretch , of 150
meter long, slab covered and mud covered drain referred in Ext.S 13 (b)
and the site plan for tracing the weapons, the local police searched for
about an hour at a stretch of about 30-40 meters and that too, without
even tilting the slabs or removing the mud: The local Police reported
that the information given by the State Special Branch was false and
baseless. On that report, the Intelligence Headquarters wanted the
S.S.B., Kozhikode Unit to give explanation. That Unit reported that the
, search conducted by the local Police was only an eyewash. Ext.S 13
(c) is the reply given by the State Special Branch, Kozhikode Unit in
that manner. Ext.S 13 (d to i) are also reports prepared by the S.S.B.
Kozhikode Unit and sent to its superiors. Ext.S 14 is the letter dated 24-
8-2002 addressed to the Inspector General of Police (Intelligence).
According to the witness, it was not likely that the large quantity of
deadly weapons seized from the Juma Masjid, Marad were collected and
stockpiled there in one day. The State Special Branch, Kozhikode Unit
had informed the Beypore Sub Inspector about the wordy altercation
regarding retaliation in the Juma Masjid in March, 2003 and that matter
had come up for discussion in the 'Kadalkodathi' held on 21-3-2003. It
was decided in the 'Kadalkodathi' that the information (on retaliation)
was not correct and that such 'rumours' should not be spread. That
'Kadalkodathi' meeting was presided over by the Assistant
Commissioner (South), Sri. Abdul Rahim. The witness learned that
though the Assistant Commissioner (South) had discussed the matter in

33

the 'Kadalkodathi' the Hindus as well as Muslims were not confident
about the version of the Assistant Commissioner (South).

9. Aw29 was the D.I.G., Kannur Range from 8-4-2002 till 1-12-2003.
He has worked as Commissioner of Police, Calicut from 30-1' 1-1991 till
9-12-1994. He made surprise visit at Marad between 9.30 PM. and 1.30
A.M on 248-2002 and noticed that only two Armed Reserve Police
Constables are posted in each Police picket posts. Those Policemen
were not checking vehicles passing through their picket post to prevent
transportation of weapons to Marad. During his earlier visit also, he had
instructed the Police to check the vehicles and suspected persons. That
was not carried out by the local Police. During the visit on 248-2002, he
had instructed the Commissioner of Police, Kozhikode, 4 Sri.
SanjivKumar PatJoshi (AW32-H. Party No. 5) and the Assistant
Commissioner (South), Sri. Abdul Rahim (FW2-H. Party No. 6) to give
written instruction in the Pata Books (of the Policemen on duty at
Marad) about the duties to be performed by them. He also instructed
them to post one local Police Constable in each picket posts (since the
local Police Constable will be capable of more policing, while the
A.R.P.C. is only for re-inforcement). He had asked the Commissioner
and Assistant Commissioner (south), to take more interest in surprise
checks. Ext. A ' 105 is the letter addressed by him to the Commissioner
after his visit at Marad on 24-8-200. It is stated in Ext. A 105 that the
Assistant Commissioner of the Control Room (in Calicut city) had no
information as to what is happening in the Control Room. There was no
effective supervision of the Control Room by the Assistant
Commissioner (Control Room) or even the Commissioner. Inspite of
repeated directions, the Television sets were not removed from the
Beypore police station and other Stations. No local Police Constable
were posted in the picket posts at Marad which contained only two

34

A.R.P.C. s each. Ext. A105 directed the Assistant Commissioner
(Control Room) to post a local Police Constable in each picket post and
the mobile patrol team to check the picket posts frequently as the
Constables on duty were not checking vehicles. The Assistant
Commissioner (South) was directed to give written instructions in the
'Pata Books' about the duties to be performed by the Constables on
duty. Aw29 got information that Bijili, S/o. Aboobacker killed in the
first communal riot was found active among certain Muslim
fundamentalist elements, Bijili was keen to avenge the killing of his
father and that he was being instigated by those fundamentalist element
for retaliation on the Hindus. AW29. conveyed the information to the
Commissioner, Sri. Sanjiv Kumar PatJoshi and asked the police to keep
vigil. Ext. S. 12 is the copy of that D.O. Letter dated 241-2003. The
witness claimed that every now and then, he had been informing the
Commissioner, Sri. PatJoshi about the tense situation at Marad. He
claimed that he issued memos to the Commissioner, Sri. SanjivKumar
PatJoshi (Aw32-H. Party No. 5) on certain inactions on the part of that
Officer. Ext:A 106 is the memo dated 5-6-2002 addressed to the
Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner (South), asking them to shed
their lethargic attitude. AW29 received complaint from the then District
Collector, Kozhikode that the Commissioner, Sri. Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi
was not regular in attending the meetings of the Communal Harmony
Committee. Thereon, AW29 issued memo to Sri. SanjivKumar Patjoshi.
Ext. Al 1 1 is the copy of that memo dated 26-8-2002. Ext. A 1 12 is the
reply given by Sri. Patjoshi on 26-8-2002. According to AW29, had the
Commissioner, Sri. Sanjiv Kumar Pat Joshi carried out his instructions
properly, the massacre at Marad on 2-5-2003 could have been averted.

10. AW31 was the Assistant Commissioner of D.S.B., Kozhikode during
the relevant time. He admitted that AW27 had given reports to him

35

whenever minor incidents occurred at Marad, that there is -possibility of
those minor incidents developing into issues between the two
communities. He used to give reports to the Commissioner also. He had
attended the Communal Harmony Meetings once or twice when directed
by the Commissioner, and in those meetings, he had reported that there
was possibility of flare-up at any time . He claimed 'that AW27 had
informed him about 10-15 minutes before the massacre on 2-5-2003 that
some incident is going to happen at Marad. He contacted the Assistant
Commissioner (South) and conveyed the information. The witness
claimed that whenever information was received about the collection of
weapons .including bombs, that was conveyed to the Commissioner who
directed the .Assistant Commissioner (South) to conduct search for the
weapons. But, AW3 1 does not know whether any weapons were traced
in such searches before 2-5-2003. He had received reports that the
Hindus and Muslims had stockpiled weapons. He had also received
information that relatives of late Aboobacker were trying to retaliate.
Ext.S 13 (j) is the report sent by him on behalf of the Commissioner,
Calicut to the Inspector General of Police (Intelligence) reporting that
the information given by the S.S.B., Calicut Unit about the stock-piling
of weapons was 'false and baseless'. According to the witness, the
local Police had conducted effective search for the weapons but, could
not trace it. (On going through the counter affidavit filed by Smt.
Sobhanakumari, Additional Secretary to the Home Department; Govt, of
Kerala in the Writ Petition filed by some of the relatives of the dead in
the massacre on 2-5-2003 in the Hon'ble High Court seeking C.B.I,
investigation, I find that the State Government also took the stand that
the Intelligence Wing had collected some information regarding the
possible violence at Marad and passed on the same to the local Police).

36

11. EWl (H Party No. 4), Sri.T.O. Suraj, District Collector, Kozhikode
during the relevant time referred to the various steps taken by the Civil
Administration after the first communal riot, for restoration of peace.
He claimed that peace meetings were convened on nine (9) occasions.
An Awareness Camp was held at Marad for women and children on 1-
10-2002. Peace rally was held at Marad Beach on 2-10-2002. Since non
availability of drinking water was a problem, 30 additional water taps
were opened. The Civil Administration spent Rs. 28,67,000/ - for relief
measures at Marad from January, 2002 till 2-5-2003. He convened
meetings of the Committee for Communal Harmony. He was getting
daily and weekly reports from the S.S.B. and D.S.B.. that the situation
at Marad was normal and peaceful. He had not received any information
from BWl or the Intelligence Wing about possible violence at Marad.
He claimed that the Intelligence Wing " was not able to collect any
information regarding the possible violence at Marad, not because of
any failure on its part but because, incidents even surpassing the
Intelligence Wing occurred. After the Section 8B notice was served on
the witness, he was recalled for further examination on 9-9-2005, when
he claimed that there was failure on the part of the Intelligence Wing to
collect relevant information regarding the possible violence at Marad.
Supporting EWl, the Clerk in S-2 Section of the Collectorate (HW3) and
the Addl. District Magistrate, Kozhikode (HW4) also claimed that in
none of the Communal Harmony Meetings, there was any reference to
any possible violence at Marad. AW2, the then R.D.., Kozhikode
referred to the steps ' taken by him to restore peace at Marad Beach. He
referred to the cases booked under S 1 07 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.

12. The Commissioner of Police, Kozhikode from 1211-2001 till 19-3-
2003 (Sri.Sanjivkumar Patjoshi - H Party No.S) gave evidence as

37

AW32. He referred to the various steps taken by him and the local
Police to maintain peace at Marad Beach. He visited the area several
times, developed contacts with the local people and carried out all
instructions given by his superiors. He explained the reasons for not
attending the Communal Harmony Meetings on few occasions. He acted
swiftly for providing infrastructure for Police at Marad, proper policing
and even for expeditious filing of chargesheets in the cases relating to
the first communal riot. He claimed that proceedings u/s. 1 07 Cr.P C
were initiated against 342 persons. After the notice u/S.8 B was served
on the witness, he gave further evidence. He then accused AW29 of
discriminating against him and produced Certain testimonials for his
'impressive performance' as Commissioner. The City Police
Administration examined the Asst. Commissioner (South) as . FW2. He
claimed that strong police patrolling and picket posts were arranged at
Marad. A control room with 24 hour wireless network was established at
Marad. List of communal goondas was opened. Rowdy list was opened.
'Kadalkodathi' was formed. Special Squad of the D.S.B. conducted
raids for weapons. All instructions given by the superior officers were
carried out. Bijili, S/o. Aboobacker was questioned thoroughly by
himself and Circle Inspector, Cheruvannur. FW3- C.I. Cheruvannur
from 28-102002 till 126-2003, FW4- S.I., , Beypore from 13-1-2002 till
19-11-2003 and FWS- S.I., in-charge of FW4 while the latter was on
leave, gave evidence about the police action at Marad during the
relevant time.

13. According to the A parties, the Intelligence Wing had collected
some information regarding the possible violence at Marad but, that was
either neglected or, lightly and casually handled by the local Police with
ulterior motives. I referred to the evidence collected by the
Commission about the information regarding possible violence. One

38

question may arise whether, the Intelligence Wing could have collected
better or more information about the possible violence. It may also be
said that as claimed by AW21, the then Director General of Police only
some generalised information was collected by the Intelligence Wing.
But, in further examination , even AW21 admitted that if the
Intelligence Wing had pointed out that a particular person was being
instigated and assisted by certain fundamentalist/ terrorist elements to
retaliate, that vas a specific information. One has to think that the
intelligence officials are not Gods or semi Gods to forecast all possible
violence. It is also to be remembered that the infrastructure provided for
the Intelligence Wing in this State when compared to the other States is
very weak and insufficient. I had occasion to discuss with a Senior
Officer of the Tamil Nadu Intelligence Wing on the working of the
Tamil Nadu Intelligence Wing. I have prepared a separate report on that
discussion. I may say, the infrastructure provided for the State
Intelligence Wing for collection and dissemination of intelligence is
very weak and insufficient. No separate fund is ' provided for the State
Intelligence Wing. The result is that the Intelligence field staff may
have to spent from their pockets (which need not be expected always) to
treat an informant or other source who gave information and for such
other matters. The field staff are not provided with sufficient
equipments to convey information received by them immediately, to
their superiors: They have to depend either, on public telephone booths
or some private telephones for the purpose. No vehicles are provided to
the field staff. The efficiency of the field staff is also worth
consideration. Since the Rules required that men of ability and aptitude
are to be posted in the Intelligence wing, I called for information from
the Commissioner of Police, Kozhikode as to what method was being
adopted to ascertain that ability and aptitude for Intelligence work. He

39

was kind and gracious enough to inform the Commission that men of
ability and aptitude are taken to the Intelligence Wing! I am sure, he
had nothing to say about the methodology adopted because, there was
none. He was also not able to tell the Commission what type of training
is being given to the Intelligence Wing. Evidence revealed that some
Policemen from other branches are simply posted in the Intelligence
Wing. The information, whatever it be collected by the State
Intelligence Wing regarding possible violence at Marad has to be
viewed, understood and appreciated in that backdrop. On going through
the oral and documentary evidence adduced before me, I can gather that
some specific information was collected by the State Special Branch,
Kozhikode Unit regarding possible violence at Marad. Exts. S8 to 18
specifically refers to the tense and dangerous situation at Marad Beach
and the Muslim youths getting ready for an attack. I find, that
information was collected by the State Special Branch about the
stockpiling of weapons by both groups in Marad Beach after the
communal riot on 3/4-1-2002 and well before 25-2003. They had also
informed that Bijili, S/o. Aboobacker was found active among the
fundamentalist elements working in the area, Bijili was keen to avenge
the killing of his father during the riot on 3/4-1-2002 and that for the
said purpose, those elements were instigating Bijili. Ext. S. IB series
contain specific information and details of those elements found active
in the area. Report dated 44-2002 stated that people feared another
violence and that efforts of the Peace Committee and the Govt, were
not yielding the desired results. There are reports about transportation
of weapons and patrol cans, use of a Jeep bearing registration No.
KLL/3848 for the purpose, and even training being given by an
organization to its selected cadres in the nearby places. It is revealed
from the evidence that huge - quantity of weapons were seized from the

40

Mosque in the early hours of 3-5-2003. Following that, the Investigation
Team conducted raids and several weapons were seized/ unearthed from
the compound of the Mosque, nearby places and even from the house of
some of the accused, some were recovered u/S.27 of the Evidence Act.
As stated by AW21, the then Director. General of Police and AW30, the
Dy.S.P, State Special Branch during the relevant time, it is difficult to
believe that all those weapons were brought to the Mosque, its
compound and other places at Marad in one or even few days before the
massacre on 2-5-2003 or even after 19-3-2003 . It is revealed from Ext.
C9, C 10 and Ext. S I to SS and the letters addressed by AW29 to
AW32 and marked through the former that since several months before
the massacre on - 2-5-2003 and ever since the Communal riots on 3/4-
01-2002, certain persons including some of the accused were collecting
/ making weapons including bombs and the same were brought to Marad
. Mosque, planted there or in the near by places. Weapons were brought
in vehicles, even under the nose of the police picket post at Vayanasala
junction which is very near to the Mosque. If the words of AW21, the
then D.G.P is to be believed, thus specific information was given by the
S.S.B., Kozhikode Unit to the local Police about possible violence at
Marad after the first communal riot in January, 2002 and before the
massacre on 2-5-2003. Information was also given to the local police
about the tense and disturbing situation at Marad and the stockpiling of
weapons in and around the Mosque. I also referred to the evidence of
AWs 27 and 3 1 about the former getting information about the untoward
happening even 10-15 minutes before the incident and the local Police
being alerted about that. I may say that with the available infrastructure
that the State Intelligence Wing had, it collected some specific
information in the matter and that was conveyed to the local Police
headed by the Commissioner of Police, Kozhikode City well in advance.

41

There is therefore, no much merit in the contention that there was
'failure' on the part of the Intelligence Wing to collect information
regarding possible violence at Marad.

14. I referred to the evidence of B W 1, the local M.L.A. as to how he
got information regarding the unrest at Marad and that information was
conveyed to the Chief Minister of the State. I referred to the evidence of
AW5 and AW30 about the wordy altercation between the two groups in
the Muslim community in the compound of Juma Masjid, Marad, few
weeks before 2-5-2003 about retaliation, that matter was brought to the
notice of the Police authorities including the Assistant Commissioner
(South) and that matter was discussed in the meeting of the
'Kadalkodathi' on 21-3-2003. From these evidence, I come to the
conclusion that through the Intelligence Wing and otherwise, the
Government and local Police were informed about the tense, disturbing
situation at Marad the stockpiling of weapons, the possible violence at
Marad and that even contained specific information.

15. EWl (H Party No. 4- Sri. T.O. Suraj) has a case that even if any such
information ' was collected by the Intelligence Wing and received by
the local Police, that was not conveyed to the Civil, Administration or
even EW 1. I referred .'to the stand of , Sri. T.O. Suraj when examined
on 29- I 2-2003. Then, he claimed that after the first communal riot and
till ' 2-5-2003, no information was given to him about any possible
violence or collection of weapons at Marad. He was getting daily and
weekly reports from the State Special Branch and the District Special
Branch. But those reports claimed that the situation at Marad was
normal and peaceful. He had no idea about the activities of the
Intelligence Wing at Marad except, that he received daily and weekly
reports. He never had the impression that the functioning of the

42

Intelligence Wing at Marad was not satisfactory. He did not also think
that the massacre on 2-5-2003 was due to the failure of the Intelligence
Wing. He was asked whether, he thought (at the time of his examination
on 29-12-2003) that the daily/weekly Intelligence reports given to him
about the situation at Marad as peaceful, were wrong. The witness
opined that his belief is that certain things which .even surpassed the
intelligence activities occurred. He had not come across any report
about the possibility of Muslim fundamentalists attacking Hindus at
Marad. He claimed that he had given direction to the police in the
Communal Harmony meetings to closely, watch and take action against
the organizations and persons indulging in any fundamentalist activities
in Kozhikode District. After the notice u/ as. 8 B of the Commission of
Inquiry Act was slammed on the witness, he gave a detailed statement in
writing to the effect that the statement made by the ' Intelligence
officials that they had collected information about the possible violence
and that such information was given to him in his capacity of the
District Magistrate, are false and intended at saving the face of the
Intelligence Wing who failed to collect information regarding violence.
When further examined on 9-9-2005, he claimed that AW30 (Dy.S.P,
Sri. Raj Mohan) had never reported in the Communal Harmony
Meetings about the possible violence at Marad. AW30 made that
statement to cover up the failure of the Intelligence to collect necessary
information. He had stated in his the earlier examination (on 29-12-
2003) that something happened surpassing the Intelligence activities
because, by then, he had not seen any Police report on the investigation
of Crime No. 82/03. In the confidential affidavit filed by EWl, he
accused AW30 for discriminating against MUSLIM officers and making
adverse reports on them. He also accused AW30 of being associated
with the Hindu fanatics.

43

16. HW3 is Sri. Subair, Clerk in the S2 Section in the District
Collector's Office from 1-8-2001 to 31-5-2005.

That section dealt with Communal Harmony Meetings, He used to take
down notes during the meetings to prepare the minutes. Whatever were
discussed in meeting are reported in the minutes. Ext.H9 is the minutes.
According to the witness, it is incorrect to say that the entire
deliberations in the meetings were not mentioned in the minutes. HW4,
Muhammed Sageer, Additional District Magistrate, Kozhikode from
April 2001 to March, 2004 claimed to have attended the Communal
Harmony Meetings at times. He claimed that AW30 had not made any
report regarding the possible violence at Marad in any of the
Communal Harmony Meetings. According to the witness, failure of the
Intelligence Wing to collect information was one of the main reasons for
the massacre on 2-5-2003. He claimed that there was only general
discussion in the Communal Harmony Meetings concerning the situation
at Marad. AW2 was the Revenue Divisional Officer during the first
communal , riot and the massacre on 2-5-2003. He used to attend the
Communal Harmony Meetings. He was recalled on the request of EW 1
(H Party No. 4). He claimed that AW30 had never reported in the
meetings that the situation at Marad is taking violent turn. No
Intelligence report also was placed in the committee for discussion. The
Civil Administration did not get any information from any Police
Officers about the possible violence at Marad before 2-5-2003. It is
contended on behalf of the Civil Administration and specifically, on
behalf of EW 1 (H party No. 4) that there is no material on record to
show that any such information even if collected by the Intelligence
Wing or the local police was conveyed to the Civil Administration or
EW 1 (H Party No. 4).

44

17. I have gone through the Guidelines issued by the State Government
in the matter of Communal Harmony Meetings. The Guidelines were
prescribed after the communal riot at Marad on 3/4-1-2002. Going by
the Guidelines, the District Collector is to convene the meetings of
the Committee for Communal Harmony where, matters relating to
communal amity is to be discussed and necessary action based on that,
is to be taken.. Ext.H9 does not mention about any Police Officer
reporting in the Communal Harmony, Meetings about the possibility of
violence at Marad. AW30 and AW32 have a case that entire matter
reported in the meetings were not being including in the minutes: It is
true, AW30 or AW32 could point - out the omission if any in the
minutes, in the next meeting of the committee but, they concededly did
not do that. From that failure of the Police Officers alone, it is ' not
possible to infer that none of them had brought to the notice of the
Committee information regarding the possible violence, the tense
situation at Marad or stockpiling of weapons. It is also difficult to think
primafacie, that the top Police Officers had not informed atleast the
District Collector who is also the District Magistrate and primarily
responsible for maintenance of law and order in the District and
particularly in the light of the Guidelines and the meetings were
convened to discuss matters which affected communal amity. According
to EWl (H Party No. 4), he was getting daily / weekly reports from the
Intelligence Wing and those reports mentioned about peace and
normalcy at Marad Beach.

How could, the S.S.B. which collected information about the tense
situation, possible violence and stockpiling of weapons at Marad Beach
suppress that from the DistrictCollector (District Magistrate)' atleast in
the Communal Harmony Meetings and paint a rosy picture about Marad
Beach by giving reports as claimed by EW 1 ?. And , for I what purpose

45

should the Intelligence Wing do that ? And, if the daily /weekly reports
thus received by EW 1 (H Party No. 4) gave an altogether different
picture of Marad Beach to mislead him (for what, God alone knows), he
could have easily summoned those daily/ weekly reports. He was wise
enough not to do that. If the Intelligence Wing and/or the local Police
had not passed on the information to the District Collector (EW 1 ), I
may say, that does not go to his credit. As per pr. 13 of the Manual of
Guidelines to Prevent and Control Communal Disturbances And to
Promote Communal Harmony, it was the responsibility of the District
Administration to identify the elements who have the , capacity to
create any possible communal riot directly or indirectly or any minor
incident between different communities which might grow into
communal problems. It is irresponsible and even exposure of
inefficiency toy claim that the District Collector who was also the
District Magistrate was not being informed by the local Police and
Intelligence wings about the alarming situation at Marad. I am unable to
think, in the absence of strong ' motive for the Intelligence Wing and
the local Police that they suppressed the real situation from the notice of
the District Collector (EWl). Atleast, there is no reason why the
Intelligence Wing and the local police should do so. I am also not very
much impressed by the last minute claimed made by EW 1 in his
"Confidential Affidavit" that AW30 was communal and targeting the
Muslim officers. That could only be treated as the 'last straw' in the
hands of EW 1 in his attempt to escape from responsibility. The then
Commissioner, Sri. Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi (AW32) told the Commission
in his evidence that he had very good relationship with EWl (I will be
referring to that ' relationship', later) and had shared whatever
information he received, with EW 1. In fact, there is indication , in
Ext.H9 itself that AW30 had given information to the District Collector

46

(EWl) regarding the tense situation at Marad. Ext. H9 (page 13 to 15)
states that AW30 had sent copy of letter dated 24-1-2002 addressed to
the Director General of Police, Kerala to the then District Collector, Sri.
Viswanath Sinha, marking it "Secret". So, AW30 was in the habit of
sharing such secret information with the District Collector as well.
There is no reason to think that AW30 stopped that practice when EWl
(H Party No. 4) assumed charge as District Collector on 14-6-2002. It is
also pertinent to note that EW 1 (H Party No. 4) had in his testimony on
29-12-2003, tried to give a clean chit to the Intelligence Wing and save
it by saying that something happened at Marad Beach, which even
surpassed the Intelligence Wing and hence the - Intelligence wing were
not able to collect information regarding violence. Obviously, EW 1 (H
Party No. 4) was claiming that inspite of best efforts, the Intelligence
Wing was not able to collect information regarding the massacre on 2-5-
2003. He did not utter a word against the Intelligence Wing then. But, ,
when he was served with a 'notice u/S8.B, he turned round and came up
with the theory that all the materials produced by the Intelligence Wing
regarding their collecting information about violence at Marad are
incorrect, their evidence to that effect and that information was given to
him are intended to cover up their failure and save their skin. According
to EW 1, he learned about the failure of the ' Intelligence Wing only
after the investigation of Crime No. 82/03 regarding the massacre on 2-
5-2003 was over and that is why, in his earlier deposition, he had not
attributed failure on the part of the Intelligence Wing. What had that
investigation to do with the Intelligence information collected by the
Intelligence Wing and what did that investigation say about collection
of Intelligence information? Only EW 1 can explain that. Assuming so
the Crime Branch had filed the charge sheet on 31-7-2003. . Was not
EWl aware of that when he was examined before the Commission on 29-

47

12-2003 ? I am not inclined to accept that explanation of EW 1 (H Party
No. 4) and can only understand that as an attempt made by him to
wriggle out from the responsibility arising from the evidence that
information was given to him. 1 asked EW 1 (H Party No. 4) in the
course of his examination on 9-9-2005 whether, he was maintaining a
Register in his office (Collectorate, Kozhikode) showing the reports
received by him from the local Police or the District Special Branch. He
had to answer in the negative. In other words, no Register even was
being maintained in the office of the District Collector, Kozhikode
during relevant time to show which all reports were actually received by
him. EW 1 (H Party No. 4) had no difficulty to say that whatever reports
were received, were being maintained by his Confidential. Assistant and
that such reports were not being placed in the Communal Harmony
Meetings. According to HW3, the clerk in the S-.2 Section in the office
of EW 1 who was dealing with the file, the secret reports were received
by the Sheristdar and were kept by EW 1 himself in his official
residence. HW3 also stated that there was no register maintained for the
reporters thus received. If this be the situation, I am left with the
evidence of EW 1 (H Party No. 4), his subordinate officers and sub-staff
(AW2, HW4 and HW3, respectively) that no such information was
received from the intelligence Wing / local Police nor, was there any
discussion regarding that, in the Communal Harmony Meetings. 1 am
not inclined to believe those words in the facts, evidence and
circumstances stated above. On the other hand, the preponderance of
probability also is in favour of the fact that information regarding the
tense situation at Marad Beach was given to the Civil Administration
headed by EW 1 (H Party No. 4).

18 Now, 1 shall come to the issue whether. Civil/ Police Administration
acted effectively and properly on the information received by them

48

regarding violence at Marad Beach ; and whether, they took timely,
preventive and remedial action to prevent the massacre on 2-5-2003. So
for as the Civil . Administration is concerned, EW 1 and AW2 testified
on the various steps taken by them to bring about peace in the area after
the riot on 3/4-1-200? . Their evidence in short, is that peace committee
was formed, several rounds ' of discussions were held to bring about
peace in the locality, relief camps were opened for those affected by the
riot, till 30-10-2002 peace meetings were convened nine times, peace
rally was held at Marad Beach on 2-10-2002, awareness camp was held
for the women and children on 1-10-2002, from January, 2002 to 2-5-
2003, Rs. 28,67,000/- (Rupees Twenty Eight Lakh and Sixty Seven
Thousand Only) was spent by the Civil Administration for relief
measures, major portion of which was used for repairing 91 houses
damaged in the riot on 3/4-1-2002, new water supply scheme itself was
launched and 30 additional water taps were opened at Marad Beach
since lack of drinking water was one of the reason for skirmishes among
the womenfolk. AW2 stated about initiating proceedings u/s.l07 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.

19. There is no disputing the fact that the Civil Administration had
initiated some steps to bring about normalcy in the area. There is the
evidence of EWl and Ext. El series about convening certain Committees,
peace really and even, a 'snehasangamam', repair of the damaged house
and opening few water taps. The question is whether, that was sufficient
to prevent further violence ? Going by Ext. S 18 series (see report dated
4-4-2002), the much said about peace initiatives taken by the Civil
Administration were not effective except, that the Revenue Authorities
had convened certain meetings. In the foregoing paragraphs I stated
how; certain persons were acquiring and stockpiling weapons either for
offence or defence. Police reports (see Ext.S13 series and S.18 series)

49

say about a Hindu family at Marad Beach collecting weapons to protect
the Hindus in case of another communal riot. Reports refer to the
rumours (as on date of that report, that was a rumour - that was proved
real on 2-5-2003) spreading in the locality about imminent communal
clashes. I referred to the evidence of BWI, the local M.L.A. about his
assessment of the situation at Marad and informing the Chief Minister
about the possible violence. Ext.S6 series shows that the letter sent by B
W 1 had even reached the City Police Administration. Evidence of BWI,
Exts. F42, 43 and other documents show that there were
Political/communal clashes at many places in Beypore Panchayat in the
year 1999, on 6-12-2001 and .the subsequent days. The civil
administration should have been aware about this. As per evidence,
senior Revenue officials including AW2 were available at Marad Beach
after the first riot on 3/4-2-2002 and before 2-52003. Evidence before
the Commission revealed that all those who visited Marad Beach after
the first communal riot and before the massacre on 2-5-2003 gut the
impression that the situation there, was alarming and that there was
distrust among the two warring communities. According to FW2 (H
Party No. 6), the peace found at Marad Beach was only superficial and
hence, he asked for more police re-inforcement vide Ext.S6 series
(between 22-8-2002 and 25-1-2003) But concededly, the senior Revenue
Officials were not able to assess the tense and dangerous situation at
Marad. May be, the Revenue Officials are not specially trained for the
purpose but even then, if the local M.L.A. and others who visited the
area were able to learn that situation, there is no reason why the senior
Revenue Officials having sufficient experience should fail in that. In
fact, in the light of Ext. HI S, atlest EWl (H Party , No. 4) could not
plead that much ignorance. Ext. HIS is the letter dated 30-7-2002 from
the Principal Secretary to the Govt, of Kerala, to the Director General of

50

Police and others referring to the 'uneasy calm' prevailing at Marad
Beach. That letter is based on a letter from EWl the District Collector.
Necessarily, the report on ' uneasy calmness' should have originated
from EW 1 who should have gut that information from his subordinates
or the Police. At any rate, atleast from the fact that some cases were
registered against some of the accused in the cases relating to communal
riots an 3/4-1-2002 under S.107 Cr.PC, the District administration and
EWI should have been aware that as claimed by EWl, everything was
not normal or peaceful at Marad Beach. Hence, there is no merit in the
contention that the District Administration and EW 1 were unaware of
the tense situation at Marad Beach.

20. The Civil Administration headed by EWl, the then District Collector
had not taken any steps to prevent violence on the premise that another
riot at Marad . Beach was possible at any point of time. Their only
claim is about conducting few camps, peace rally or even
'snehasangamam' (which itself did not yield result) or opening few
water taps. One must bear in mind that the area was communally torn
and divided right from 1954 and saw a fierce riot just few months back.
AW2 himself states from the copy of report to the then District
Collector, Sri: Viswanath Sinha referred in Ext. H9 that it was reported
by the SSB that the peace conferences ' convened by the Revenue,
Officials did not acquire the confidence of the people of Marad at the
grass root level. The Civil Administration should have borne in mind
that communal division had, for several reasons gone deep into the mind
of the people. The Civil Administration either failed to learn or forgot
this ground reality. I do not forget the evidence of AW2 about booking
some cases against certain persons u/s.l07 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. AW2 filed a statement when recalled for further Examination
at the instance of EW 1 (H Party No. 4) showing the details of such

51

cases. But, AW2 conceded that in most of those cases, proceedings were
dropped after the period of the interim bond. It is revealed from the
evidence of AW2 that 16 cases were thus dropped. According to AW2,
he was otherwise busy with several other official matters and hence, -
could not complete the proceedings within six (6) months. But, AW2
was not that much helpless S.I16 (6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
empowered him to direct that such proceedings would continue even
after the expiry of the period of six months from the date of its
commencement provided, there were special reasons for that, to be
reduced to writing. Therefore, I am to presume that if those proceedings
u/s.I07 of the Code had a natural death on the expiry of the said period
of six months, according to AW2, there existed no special reason to
direct continuance of the proceedings beyond the said period of six
months. As per pr. 14 of the Manual of Guidelines on Communal
Harmony referred , above, cases against persons indulging in communal
/ fundamentalist activities including, cases booked under S.107 CrPC
are to be vigorously pursued in Courts. Hence the District
Administration headed by EWl cannot be heard to say that they were
otherwise busily engaged had no enough time and hence, the cases had
to be dropped half the way. Fact remained, that the cases booked under
S.107 Cr.PC were not effectively or vigorously pursued by the District
Administration and hence, had a natural death. In fact, even the
evidence of AW2 revealed that the impression of normalcy at Marad
was also reason for not pursuing the cases booked u/s.I07 Cr.PC.

21. I find from the evidence of AW32, the then Commissioner of Police,
Calicut and other materials on record that the Communal Harmony
Meetings were not really effective. Going by the evidence of AW30,
Communal Harmony Meetings were an eyewash. For, his claim is that
on the, meeting of the Communal Harmony and Malabar Mahotsava

52

Committee were held simultaneously. I do not forget that EW 1 and
HW4 denied that. I do not also expect them to admit that. A responsible
officer - AW30- has made a very serious statement and filed an
affidavit in that line. It i~ revealed from Ext.H9 and that evidence of
HW3 that instruction was received from the State Government on 5-4-

2002 to hold meetings of the Committee for Communal Harmony. As
per Pr.7 of the Guidelines on Communal Harmony Meetings, such
meetings were to be held atleast once in a month at the District level for
review of the Intelligence and the District Administration was to send
monthly reports of the review to the State , Govt, with copy to the Head
of Intelligence of the State before the 10th of every month. Between 24-
4- 2002 and 29- 3-2003, the Communal Harmony Meetings were held
only on 24-4-2002, 21-6-2002, 24-8-2002, 8-11-2002, 2-12-2002. 10-2-

2003 and 29-3-2003. That means, there were no such meeting convened
every month. Ext. H9 revealed that the meetings convened on 244-2002,
2 I -6-2002 and 24-8-2002 lasted for one hour each and the meetings on
8-11-2002 and 29-3-2003 lasted for 1/2 an hour each. It is surprising to
note that the meetings on 2-12-2002 and 10-2-2003 lasted only for I S
minutes each. Certainly, there were no serious deliberations made in the
Communal Harmony Meetings. That did not go to the credit of the
District Civil Administration headed by EW 1 (H Party- No. 4). Thus,
evidence revealed that' the Communal Harmony Meetings were not
being convened as mandated by the Guidelines nor were the meetings
convened, effective. There was no effective action from the side of the -
Civil Administration to prevent the recurrence of violence at Marad
Beach, one of the most politically and communally sensitive areas of the
District.

22. The next question arose whether, there was failure on the part of the
City Police Administration in taking timely preventive and remedial

53

action? I referred to the oral and documentary evidence to say that the
State Intelligence Wing had given information to the City Police
Administration regarding the possible violence at Marad Beach,
including the collection of weapons on large scale and Bijili, S/o.
Aboobacker killed on 4-1-2002 trying to retaliate on Hindus with the
assistance and under instigation from Muslim fundamentalist elements.
AW32, Sri. Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi also admits that he received such
information. 1 referred to the evidence of AW29, the then D.I.G.
Kannur Range about his surprise visit at Marad Beach on 24-8-2002 arid
earlier, and giving specific directions to the Commissioner of Police
(AW32) and the Assistant Commissioner (South), Sri. Abdul Rahim
(FW2). The evidence of AW29 is that inspite of his giving specific
information and directions, the City Police headed by the
Commissioner, Sri. Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi (AW32) and the south Sub
Division headed by Assistant Commissioner, Sri. Abdul Rahim (FW2)
were lethargic in their action and that contributed to the massacre on 2-
5-2003. In specific terms, AW29 (Sri. Sankar Reddi) stated that had the
local Police carried out his directions, that would have prevented the
massacre on 2-5-2003. He supported his claim with reference to several
documents. I already referred to Ext. A I 05, the letter addressed by
him to AW32 after his surprise visit at Marad Beach at 9 pm on 24-8-
2002 and earlier. Ext.A106 is the memo dated 5-6-2002 given by him to
AW32, the Commissioner, requiring the latter and the Assistant
Commissioner (South) under him to shed their lethargic attitude.
Ext.AlO? is another letter dated 14-5-2002 from AW29 and addressed to
the Commissioner of police (AW32) Assistant Commissioner, South (-
FW2-) etc., regarding the situation, at Marad Beach. AW29 directed
those officers to continue raids and take all steps to avoid any further
incidents in the area. They were directed to closely watch the activities

54

of those accused in the cases relating to the riot on 3/4-1-2002 who were
on bail. Ext. Sll is the D.O. letter dated 12-4-2002 from AW29, to Sri.
Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi (AW32) on the possibility of .recurrence of
violence at Marad Beach. It states that in the event ; of withdrawal of
Police, violence will break out as the Muslim youths were bent upon
avenging the killing of Aboobacker, that a particular organization is
trying to extent its influence in Marad area and that its supporters were
organizing training classes at Chakkumkadavu, towards north of Marad
Beach. In Ext.S 1 I, AW29 gave list of 13 activists of that organization
(of them, three are accused in Cr. 82/03 of Beypore Police station -
Cr.ll6/CR/03 of C.B.C.I.D., Kozhikode) in the area who according to
AW29, were potentially dangerous. Ext.S 12 is another D.O. letter dated
24-1-2003 from AW29, again addressed to Sri. Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi
(AW32) , stating that there are disturbing trends at Marad Beach, the
RSS Sakhas are found active in the area and that the R.S.S. men are
stockpiling weapons to protect the Hindu families in the event of a
communal flare-up.

It is further stated in Ext.S 12 that Bijili S/o. Aboobacker, killed in the
riot on 4-1-2002 was found active among Muslim fundamentalist
elements in Marad area, he is an expert in martial arts was keen to
avenge the murder of his father and is being instigated by the
fundamentalist elements for retaliation against the Hindus. The recipient
of the letter was asked to keep close watch and take necessary action.
Ext. Alio is the general instructions given to Sri. Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi
(AW32) and others after the monthly crime review. Ext.Alll is the memo
dated 26-8-2002 ' issued to Sri. Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi (AW32) stating
that the latter had not attended the Communal Harmony Meeting on 248-
2002 and instead, was engaged in attending the felicitation function of
cine actor, Jagathi Sreekumar. Ext. A 112 is the reply dated 26-11-2002

55

from Sri. Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi- (AW32) explaining the reason for his
inability to attend the Communal Harmony Meeting on 24-8-2002.
AW32 claimed that he had convened another meeting at 4 PM. on 24-8-
2002 in the matter of giving protection to the Grassim Company as per
the order of the Hon'ble High Court, the District Collector had, on 8-11-
2002 unilaterally fixed the meeting, he could not attend that meeting
also since that day, he had to accompany the Senior Police Officers to
the college ground, the venue of the meeting of the President of India.
Sri. Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi (Aw32), in answer to the complaint of EWl
(H Party No. 4), the then District Collector about the former not
attending the Communal Harmony Meetings, reported that S.S.B.,
Calicut and Trivandrum units said that EW I was communal and corrupt
and that since he (Sri. Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi) belonged to the All India
Service Batch of 1991 and EW 1 was a promote/conferred All India
Service Batch of 1996, the decorum of All India Service required that
the District Collector (EW I ) should have checked up with Sri. Sanjiv
Kumar Patjoshi before complaining. Sri. Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi
(AW32) explained that "it is totally unbecoming of Collector to
complaint to superior of me about very minor issue of not attending one
monthly Intelligence Meeting". He also claimed that he attended the
function of Jagathi Sreekumar at 6 P.M. on that day and that the "whole
Calicut City people, media are all appreciating and calicut city police
image has gone up very high"

23. In answer to the above version of AW29, Sri. Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi
gave evidence as AW32. He was the Commissioner, Calicut from 12-11-
2002 to 19-3-2003 (the massacre was .on 2-5-2003). He claimed that he
had been attending the meetings of Communal Harmony except when he
was engaged in more important and urgent works. He' claimed that he
had ' taken steps for providing; infrastructure at Marad such as

56

providing watch tower, control room etc., and produced documents in
support of that. He claimed that he had taken steps for proper
investigation of the cases relating to the first communal riot, to
apprehend the accused and complete the investigation in record time.
He forwarded the case diary after investigation to the Director General
of Police on 6-4-2002. There was long delay in obtaining the
prosecution sanction which according to him, was one reason that
ultimately resulted in the massacre on 2-5-2003 There was long delay in
the Revenue department providing the scene plans. As per his
instruction, proceedings were initiated u/s.l07 Cr. P C. against 342
accused involved in the cases relating to the first communal riot. As per
.is instruction, rowdy lists were opened. But, the S.D.M. (AW2)
dropped the proceeding against the accused abruptly. He claimed that it
was due to his proper and effective policing that there were no major
incident at Marad Beach until he handed over charge on 19-3-2003. He
admitted that he had received the original of Ext.S 12 and claimed that
immediately on getting that letter, directed the Assistant Commissioner,
south (-FW2-) and Circle Inspector, Cheruvannoor {FW3) to warn Bijili
not to create law and order problem, to keep watch on Bijili and to
include him in the goonda list and initiate Section 107 Cr.PC
proceedings against him. On that direction, the Assistant Commissioner
(South) reported the same day that there was no such person as Bijili
and that S.S.B Calicut say that it may be 'Noufal' . He did not believe
that statement of the Assistant Commissioner (South) and asked him and
other officers to trace Bijili. Then the Assistant Commissioner (South),
told him that he had questioned Bijili, recorded his statement and is
verifying various aspects of Bijili. To the witness, it appeared that the
Assistant Commissioner (South), was trying to shield Bijili. The
Assistant Commissioner (South) had told him that Bijili is included in

57

the communal goonda list and that the Assistant Commissioner (South)
was keeping vigil on Bijili. He had received information contained in
Ext.S 13 and claimed that it was correct to say that some organizations
and elements were instigating certain persons for violence at Marad
Beach. He claimed that he had deputed the bomb squad to search for
weapons. He had provided tear gas shells, rubber bullets, plastic bullets
with guns, 303 rifles, riot shields; lathis and extra jeep for exclusive
patrolling in Marad area and an average of 30 men from the A.R. camp
for deployment at Marad. Moreover, there were around 30 Constables in
Beypore Police Station which was sufficient to control the law and order
situation at Marad. He v had also asked the Assistant Commissioner
(South) to take men if necessary, from his sub division where, there may
be around 400 men. On his relationship with AW29, his immediate
superior officer, AW32 claimed that he had very cordial relationship
just like equal brother officers. Pursuant to the notice under Section 8 B
of the Act served on AW32, he was further examined. Then, he accused
AW29 of discriminating against him while protecting Sri.T.Vikram,
I.P.S. who took over additional charge of the Commissioner, Calicut on
his transfer on 19-3-2003 and Sri.T.K.Vinodkumar (FW6) who took
over charge as Commissioner from Sri.T. Vikram on 31-3-2003. AW32
claimed that for any silly and minor matters such as not wearing
uniform while in office (according to him; he was not expected to wear
uniform ' in office) or a ' minor mistake in his weekly diary regarding
the time of his arrival at the, parade ground, , AW 29 was issuing
memos to him. AW29 never helped him (AW32) in the discharge of his
duties. Instead, AW29 was trying to find fault with whatever action
taken by AW32. It was also the version of AW32 that AW29 had
illegally interfered in the investigation of certain crime cases such as
the custodial rape case at Medical College Hospital, the case for illicit

58

possession of arrack and the case against a foreign national for alleged
harassment of his wife. Bypassing him, AW 29 gave instructions to the
officers who investigated those cases to act illegally to save the
accused. That was objected by AW32. For that AW 29 was harassing
him. AW32 produced Exts. H 54 to 58 and Ext. H68, copy of his
weekly diaries to show that often he has been patrolling at Marad Beach
and inspecting the picket posts. Some documents are to show how
effective his policing at Calicut City was, and how that was appreciated
by some of his superior officers, the public and the media: (This aspect
will be discussed in the coming Chapter). AW32, in his further
examination claimed that he learned that the tight grip of the police over
the situation at Marad loosened after he handed over charge on 19- 3-
2003 and that resulted in the massacre on 2-5-2003.

24. The then Assistant Commissioner (South Sub Division), Sri. Abdul
Rahim gave evidence as FW2. He was the Assistant Commissioner,
(South) Sub . Division from 17-6- 2002 till 9-5-2003. Marad Beach
which is under Beypore police station came in Cheruvannoor circle
under the South Sub Division. He had learned on assuming charge on
17-6-2002, that Marad is a communally and politically sensitive area.
He arranged for strong Police patrolling and pickets at Marad. A control
room with 24 hour wireless network was established. Officers of and
above the rank of. Assistant Sub Inspectors were posted for patrol duty.
List of communal goondas was prepared and they were put on watch.
Rowdy list was opened against 97 Muslims and 71 Hindus. Proceedings
were initiated against 320 persons from both communities.
'Kadalkodathi' was established. That consisted of 8 persons each from
each side, the Assistant Commissioner (South), Circle Inspector,
Cheruvannoor and Sub Inspector, Beypore as members. That
'Kadalkodathi' was constituted for settlement of minor disputes even

59

while legal action was initiated. The 'Kadalkodathi' met on 12
occasions between 28-1-2002 and 21-3-2003. (Ext. F5 is the minutes of
the Kadalkodathi which shows that it had 7 sittings from 17-6-2002 till
9-5-2003. He denied the suggestion of A parties that he was informed by
the representatives of the Hindu community about the wordy altercation
in front of the Juma Masjid at Marad on whether or not, there must be
retaliation on the Hindus, the matter came up for discussion in the
meeting of the Kadalkodathi on 21-3-2003 and that he informed the
members that the information is baseless. FW2 claimed that the Special
Squad from the D.S.B. conducted several raids at Marad Beach for
recovery of weapons. He issued direction to the Station House Officer,
Beypore to prescribe duties to the policemen in the picket posts. Ext.F6
is his letter dated 12-2-2002. He instructed that Pata books be kept in
each picket post, there should be local Police Constables along with the
A.R.P C. in each picket post, vehicles and strangers passing by the
picket posts must be checked and that the officers should conduct
surprise checks in the picket posts day and night. When he found that
there was no sufficient men, he addressed letter to the Commissioner,
Calicut. Ext.S6 series are the true copy of those letters dated 22-8-2002,
6-9-2002 and 25-1-2003. (in Ext. S6 dt. 22-8-2002, there is request to
the Commissioner for more police strength.) FW2 claimed that no action
was taken on that request until he was transferred from Calicut (South)
Sub Division. As regards the instructions on Bijili, he claimed that he
contacted the S.S.B., Calicut Unit and learned that there was no such
person as Bijili and that it may be ' Noufal', still he conducted enquiry,
.traced , Bijili, the Circle Inspector Cheruvannoor and himself
questioned Bijili and warned him against indulging in any such
activities, recorded his statement and kept him under watch. He claimed
that he thought that peace was restored at Marad, but he later realised

60

that it was superficial. That was why, he asked for more Policemen vide
Ext. S6. He was on leave for 4 days during the first weak of April,
2003. He ' was again on leave from 16-4-2003 till 1-5-2003 and
resumed charge on 1-5-2003. He learned about the massacre on 2-5-
2003 at 6 P.M. that day, immediately came to the scene and engaged
himself law and order maintenance duties. He proved Ext. A3, search
list prepared for seizure of swords, knives, chopper etc., from the Juma
Masjid, Marad in the early hours of 3-5-2003. He claimed that he had
scheduled a reception for his colleagues at Calicut in the evening of 3-
5-2003 in connection with the marriage of his daughter but, that had to
be postponed due to the incident on 2-5-2003. He denied the version of
AW'2I , the then D.G.P that he was not that much innocent as regards
the circumstances that lead to the massacre on 2-5-2003, tried to shield
one of the main culprits in that incident and was some how trying to
remain at Calicut even after he was transferred, trying to understand
from the Crime Branch sleuths as to who all are the accused in the case.
He produced certain press reports to controvert the version of AW21.

25. AW21, the then D.G.P. claimed that learning about the massacre, he
came down to Calicut and held quick enquiry about the incident and
transferred the case to the Crime Branch for investigation. During that
time, he got reports about FW2 (Sri. Abdul Rahim) which were not
good. FW2 had been deputed to enquire into certain information
received before 25-2003 and take action on that. He did not deal with
that matter as required. He did not intimate the real situation at Marad
to his superior officers. He tried to make it appear that some person
whom the Investigating agency considered to be an accused, was not
really involved in the incident. Even after FW2 was transferred from
Calicut (South sub division) and even though he had no official job, he
was trying to learn what the Crime Branch was going to do, who are all

61

going to be made accused etc., Consequent to the section 8 B notice
served on FW2, AW21 was recalled for further examination. AW21
proved Ext. A 104 (a), a report in the 'Malayalam' magazine based on a
conversation with AW2I. He claimed that FW2 (Abdul Rahim) was
posted at Calicut (South sub Division) without his knowledge, that
posting was unusual and after the incident, on 2-5-2003, when AW21
checked up the matter with his office; learned that a Muslim Leader had
' played a role in the posting of FW2 at Calicut (South Sub Division).
But, he did not try to find out who, that Muslim leader was. He is sure
that FW2 was not posted at Kozhikode (South Sub Division) as per the
proposal of the D.G.P He admitted that for the transfer and posting of
officers of and above the rank of Dy.S.P, proposal from the D.G.P. ,vas
- not required. Except recommending to the Government (Ext.C95 is his
letter dated 15.5.2003) that on 'public interest' FW2 may be transferred
from Calicut (South Sub Division), he had not taken any other
departmental or legal action against FW2, one of the reasons being that
he retired on 31-5-2003. He asserted that he is aware whom, FW2 was
trying to save but declined to speak out that since it was not proper for
him to do so, as the case (Crime No. 82/03) was under trial.

26. FW3 is Abdul Hameed, Circle Inspector, Cheruvannoor from 28- 10-
2002 till 12-6-2003. He claimed that he used to visit Marad almost daily
and alert the policemen on duty. Instruction was given to them to
observe the accused involved in the cases relating to the first communal
riot. Raids were conducted for tracing weapons. Ext. F2I is his : weekly
diary produced to show that he had questioned Bijili on 28-1-2003 and
on 2,3 other occasions. Ext.F22 is the statement of Bijili) 1 recorded by
the witness, on 28-1-2003. FW4 is K.V. Rahuramam, Sub Inspector,
Beypore from 13-1-2002 to 19-11-2003. He was on medical leave from
19-1-2003 to 9-2-2003 and on training, from 6-4-2003 to 3-5-2003. Ext.

62

F23 series are the copy of the General Diary maintained in the Beypore
Police Station for the period from 3-11-2002 till 30-6-2002, 1-7-2002
till 30-10-2002 and from 31-10-2002 till 29-4-2003 produced to show
that there was effective patrolling of the area and that several raids were
conducted for tracing the weapons. Ext. F24 is the rowdy history sheet
opened by the Beypore Police against 167 persons. Ext. F25 is the First
Information Report Index for initiating Section 107 proceedings against
319 persons. Ext.F26 is the F.I.R. register for seizure of 9 tin bombs
from the terrace -of the Government Veterinary hospital, Beypore. FW5
was Sub Inspector in-charge" at Beypore station from 6-4-2003 till 3-5-
2003. He claimed that learning about the incident on 2-4-2003, himself
and party proceeded to Marad and while they reached near Priya Hotel
Junction, himself and party were obstructed by a group led by P.P
Moideen Koya - H Party No. 2 - (a local I.U.M.L. leader, member of the
local panchayat from the ward including Marad and accused in Crime
No. 82/03) and others. They pelted stones and country bombs at the
police party. They carried knives, stones swords, sticks etc. The Police
party dispersed the group and proceeded to Marad.

27. FW6 is Sri. T.K.Vinod Kumar, Commissioner, Calicut from 31-3-
2002 till 18-8-2004. He deposed to the various steps taken by the Police
under him .to prevent spreading of violence after the massacre on 2-5-
2003. He produced copy of- his weekly .report (Ext. F28) which
revealed that during 31-3-2002 to 2-5-2003, he visited Marad Beach
thrice.

28. I referred to the Intelligence Reports and other evidence to show
that sufficient information was given to the local Police regarding the
collection and stock-piling of weapons at Marad by different groups and
the specific information given to them about Bijili and others preparing

63

for violence at the instance of certain Muslim fundamentalist elements. I
also referred to the evidence on record to show that those weapons were
not collected in one day or two before the massacre on 2-5-2003 and
that those weapons, in the normal course should and would have reached
the area long before 2-5-2003. Even going by the words of the then
D.G.P (AW2I ), it was not explicitly clear when those weapons were
collected and stockpiled at Marad and that his information was that most
of the weapons unearthed after the massacre on 2-5-2003 were rusted.
According to AW21, it was quite distressing that the Police did not get
information on that. Evidence revealed that weapons were freely
collected and brought to Marad Beach and planted even in the
compound of the Juma Masjid Mosque at Marad, under the nose of the
Police picket Post. As per Ext.S 1, the statement of the 2nd accused in
Cr. 82/03 of Beypore Police station (Cr.ll6/CR/03 of C. B.C.I. D.), large
number of country bombs were collected from elsewhere or made in the
, sea and brought to Marad Beach in country boats, collected in plastic
buckets, brought to the Mosque compound in autorikshaw or other
vehicles and planted there. So also, large number of swords and other
weapons were brought to the Mosque compound in -sacks and planted
there. They had arranged to carry out the attack even a month before (2-
5-2003), but since the news leaked out, they gave up the plan then. Still,
our Police personal deployed in the area did not know about any of it!
Ext.S 1 reveals that weapons were brought to the Mosque compound in a
jeep and autorickshaw (that jeep was seized by the Crime Branch team )
but, the Police men on duty at Marad Beach ' did not know about it at
least, once. Those vehicles could not have reached the Mosque
compound except by crossing the picket posts at least, at Vayanasala
junction which is very close to the Mosque. The policemen on duty
there also, did not learn about the transportation of weapons! AW29

64

issued direction to AW 32 to check the vehicles and the suspected
persons coming , through the Police pickets and prescribe duties in the
patta books. AW32 passed on that direction to FW2. And, what could
FW2 do?. He passed on the direction to the Beypore Police and even
mentioned that in the visiting officers remarks diary kept in that station.
But, ultimately, were those directions implemented ?. Evidence is nil.
Neither AW32 nor FW2 who faced action u/s 8B of the Act dared to
cause production of the Patta books of the Policemen on duty at the
picket posts. None of those Policemen are summoned as witness also. It
is difficult to believe that none of the Policemen on duty in the picket
posts could learn about the transportation of weapons which, going by
evidence of the C B C I D, started immediately after the accused in the
riot cases of 3/4-1-2002 were released an bail (after 90 days). It is
eminently clear that there was no checking of vehicles or suspected
persons passing through the picket posts. I do not forget that the weekly
diaries of AW32 (Exts. H54 to 58 and H68) and the weekly diary of
FW3 (Ext. F2I ) revealed that they had patrolled Marad Beach. AW32
also checked certain picket posts. But there was a specific direction by
AW29 to AW32 and FW2 to conduct surprise checks in the night. The
documents do not show such patrolling or checking by FW3 after 7.30
pm. and by AW32, after 10.30 pm. FW2 was careful enough not to
produce his weekly diary. It is certain that there was neither any
effective policing nor, patrolling in the beach, worth the name.

May be, certain actions were taken in the most casual manner, as none
other than AW29 himself said, but that was not effective. It is
distressing and disturbing to note from the evidence of FW 1 who
supervised the investigation of crime cases relating to the riot on 3/4-1-
2002 that no investigation was conducted then as to how, such large
number of weapons reached Marad Beach. I referred to the war of

65

nerves between AW30, the Dy.S.P. of the State Special Branch and
AW31, the Assistant Commissioner, D.S.D:; Calicut on the information
given by the former regarding collection of weapons at a specific spot
and the alleged failure of the local Police to unearth it. I also referred to
Ext.S 13 (a), the report given by AW30 with site plan. The materials on
record revealed that though, specific information was given about
concealment of weapons in the mud filled, slab covered drain at a
stretch of 150 meters, the local Police conducted some search at a
stretch of 30-40 meters without removing the mud and without even
tilting the slabs. The report given by AW3 I for and on behalf of AW32
was that the information given by the State Special Branch was 'false
and baseless' . It has come in evidence that though the report regarding
collection of weapons was given on 16 9-2002, the search was held only
few days later, on 18-9-2002 with the possibility of the culprits even
removing the weapons by then. I am unable to understand how, the
District Special Branch (under the direct control of AW32) in such
circumstances, could describe the information given by the State Special
Branch as false and baseless' unless, they wanted to cover-up their own
failure. AW3 1 conceded that he had sent report (Ext.S13 (j)) on behalf
of the then commissioner (AW32) , that the information given by the
State special Branch was 'false and baseless'. So, AW32 was not
unaware of the stand of the D.S.B. AW3 1 does not know whether, any
of the slabs were tilted for the search. According to him, the raid party
stated about the use of metal detector and search by hitting over the mud
portion with iron rods. He may have obtained a report on the search
from the circle Intspector, Cheruvannoor and Sub Inspector, Beypore
who are said to have led the search but, no such report was referred in
Ext.S 13 (j). Hence, AW3I was unable to give a specific comment on the
version of the State. Special Branch contained in Ext.S13(C) as to the

66

manner in which the local Police had conducted the search . The witness
conceded from Ext.S 13 (k), the report given by him on behalf of the
Commissioner that the slabs were not tilted or removed (since the same
were large!). Even the evidence of FWs. 2 and 3 regarding that search is
not very convincing. Concededly, the service of the Intelligence field
staff (AW27) who had given that report was not obtained by the local
Police for the search. Thus, on the available material, the reasonable
conclusion to be drawn is that as reported by AW30, the search
conducted by the local Police on the information given by the State
Special Branch was nothing but an eyewash. AW30 even complained
that the local police had a tendency to under-estimate the S.S.B. and
describe the information given by the latter as ' false and baseless'. For
instance, the S.S.B. reported about the possibility of violence in the eve
of the Is anniversary of the riot on 3(4-1-2002. Based on that
information , more Policemen were deployed and nothing untoward
happened. Then, the local Police would say that the information given
by the S.S.B. was 'false and baseless'. That in that area also, weapons
were stockpiled is evident from the admitted fact that the staff of the
Government Veterinary Hospital Beypore found 9 tin bombs on the
terrace of that building, information was given to the police and the
same were taken to custody by the police and defused. That seizure did
not in any way go to the credit of the local Police. Though, AW32, FW2
and FW3 claimed about several raids for weapons after the January,
2002 incident and before 2-5-2003, and produced some documents
(Exts. F19 and 23) to support that, verification of those documents show
that it was etly ence - and once alone on 2-1-2003 - that the raid by the
DSB and bomb squad yielded result - some weapons were traced (details
of the weapons seized , are not available). Ext.F19, the photo copy of
reports of raid is for the period from 6-1-2002 till 6-5-2003. During

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that period, there were altogether eight (8) raids at Marad Beach and
nearby places. Some weapons were reportedly traced on 2-1-2003. But,
it is strange that the G.D. entry on 2-1-2003 is missing in Ext. F23(b).
On no other occasion during the period of about 17 months, could the
local Police trace even a single weapon, not because and there were no
weapons planted, but because the raids were casual the ineffective.
There was lack of coherence, trust and coordinated action between the
S.S.B. and D.S.B. and between the SSB and the local Police. The
direction contained in P. 57 of Ext. S13 to conduct raid in the compound
of Mosque for weapons was admittedly never carried out. In the light of
that direction at least AW32 and FW2 should have taken action against
the Mosque authorities under the provisions of the Religions Institutions
(Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 by calling for information regarding
the collection of weapons in the Mosque and its compound, and if
necessary, conduct raids. There is no case or evidence that any such step
was taken by AW32 or FW2. The evidence revealed that there was
failure of the local Police to effectively search for the weapons and
trace the same in spite of several information given by the S.S.B. and
AW29. The local Police also failed to prevent the weapons being
brought to Marad Beach and stockpiled there.

29. I referred to the information given by the Intelligence Wing as well
as AW29 to the local 'Police on the attempt of Bijili. instigated and
assisted by certain Muslim fundamentalist elements to wreak vengeance
on the Hindus for the killing of his father, Aboobacker on 4-1-2002
Concededly, that information was ultimately proved to be true in that
Bijili is one of the prime accused : in Crime No. 82/03 (Cr.No.ll6/CR/03
of C.B.C.I.D) and as per the Crime Branch C.I.D. Unit (See Ext.C9)
Bijili, along with his a paternal uncle, Muhammed Ali played leading
role in conspiring planning and executing the murders on 2-5-2003.

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Ext.S 12, the D.O. letter addressed to Sri. Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi
(AW32) is dated 24-1-2003. AW32 (Sri. Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi) in his
turn, immediately informed FW2 (Sri. Abdul Rehim) to initiate
necessary action. The same day, FW2 reported to AW32 that there was
no such person as Bijili and that S.S.B. Calicut Unit said that it may be
'Noufal'. Ext.X19 is the remark of FW2. Ext H14 is the visiting remark
of FW2 at Beypore Police Station on 24-1-2003. That is to the effect
that Bijili could not be located _ from the array of accused or injured (in
the incidents on 3/4-1-2002), that, S.S.B. Calicut informed FW2 that it
may be 'Noufal' and that the Sub Inspector, Beypore should collect the
name and keep a close watch . There is no evidence to show that FW2
had contacted the S.S.B., Calicut Unit and got any such reply. AW30
denied that any such enquiry was made with the S.S.B. unit. Such a
reply was quite unlikely also as the S.S.B. Kozhikode Unit and AW29
had specifically stated about the activities of Bijili, S/o. Aboobacker,
victim of the riot on 4-1-2002. There was no reasonable possibility of
FW2 doubting the identity of Bijili since 1W2 was the Assistant
Commissioner (south) from 17-6-2002 onwards and Ext.S 12 was dated
24-1-2003. FW2, without any difficulty conceded that there was no
difficulty for him in identifying or tracing Bijili since, Bijili was
described as S/o. Aboobacker, a popular Muslim killed in the communal
riot on 4- 1 -2002. Even FW2 has not given a statement before this
Commission that he had any doubt on the identity of Bijili. If that be
so, there was no possibility of FW2 having any genuine doubt regarding
the identity of Bijili.' In other words FW2, for reasons known to him
reported to AW32, the Commissioner on 24-1-2003 itself that there was
no such person as Bijili and that it may be 'Noufal'. 'Assuming so,
question arose why FW2 did not try to trace the said Noufal, who is also

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said to be an N.D.F. activists of the area. If that was the impression of
FW2, he should have traced Noufal atleast. That also was not done.

30. Now I shall refer to the version of FW's2 and 3 as to how
effectively, they questioned Bijili. Though, it is their version that FW2
also had questioned Bijili; there is no record for at, not even a mention
of that in the Station General Diary. FW2 did not produce his weekly
diary if any, to show that he had questioned Bijili. Though , FW3
claimed to have questioned Bijili on different occasions, it is conceded
by him also that Ext.F21 (his weekly diary) only mentioned that he
enquired about Bijili on 26-1-2003 but, that document did not say that
he had ever traced or questioned Bijili on any day or recorded his
statement. Ext.F22 is the copy of the statement of Bijili said to be
recorded by FW3 on 28-1-2003. I stated that the questioning on 28-1-
2003 is not even mentioned in Ext.F21. In other words, there is no
supporting document to show that FW3 had questioned Bijili on any
date as claimed by him. Assuming that FW3 had actually questioned
Bijili on 28-1-2003 as stated in Ext.F22, assuming that FW2 also had
questioned Bijili subsequently, how effective was that questioning ? The
evidence revealed that Bijili had only primary education and is a
fisherman by occupation. According to FWs. 2 and 3 they, officers in
the rank of an Assistant Commissioner and Circle Inspector questioned
Bijili on several days but, were not able to gather anything from Bijili
about him designs. Ext.s.C9 and CIO show how Bijili was a party to the
conspiracy and the massacre on 2-. 5-2003. Was Bijili so intelligent,
wise and shrewd that he could escape the grilling interrogation by two
or three senior Police officers for hours? I am not persuadd to think so.
Instead, reason persuades me to think that either, those Officers had not
questioned or even seen Bijili and instead, to cover up their failure,
manipulated a statement like Ext.F22, or it was a causal questioning by

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some of them. Ext.F22 shows that it is a small statement. Concededly,
FW2 or FW3, did not ascertain who are the friends and associates of
Bijili, with whom was he contacting and such other matters which were
essential in a proper interrogation. They did not ascertain whether Bijili
had a land phone or a Mobile Phone, In other words, even if I were to
assume that Bijili were questioned by FW2 and / or FW3, they did not
cross check his version that he is not indulging any such unlawful
activity and instead, were satisfied with his statement contained in,
EXt.F22 as if, they thought that Bijili would otherwise admit that he
was involving himself in the conspiracy. AW29 stated that if Bijili were
properly questioned, that would have definitely disclosed his plans and
the conspiracy already hatched up. Certainly; the local Police failed in
effectively questioning Bijili and getting his plans disclosed.

31. Exts.F24 and F25 are produced to show that rowdy history sheets
were opened against 167 persons and that proceedings u/s 107 Cr.P.C.
were initiated against 319 persons. Inspite of the specific information
given by the S.S.B. and AW29 about Bijili, the latter did not figure in
Exts.F24 or F25. why was Bijili spared from those proceedings? I stated
in the earlier paragraphs how the proceedings u/sl07 Cr.PC. had to be
dropped half the way. Concededly, the local Police had not filed any
report in those cases to continue the proceedings even after the initial
period of six months. The local Police neglected that also. According to
AW32, he had directed FW2 to include Bijili in the Rowdy History
sheet and proceedings u/s 107 CrPC. But, nothing of that sort was done:
AW32 did not check up the follow-up action. There is no evidence to
show that Bijili was kept under watch. Fact is that Bijili was simply let
loose. AW32 and FW2 are responsible for ' that. I do not forget that
going by the weekly diaries of AW32, he had visited Marad Beach
several times and on some occasions, he had also checked the picket

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posts. But facts, evidence and circumstances revealed that the same
were not effective or sufficient.

32. I referred to the evidence of AW29 and Exts.AlOS, 107 and the
'Secret' documents regarding the instructions given by AW29, to
AW32, FW2 and others for proper policing and patrolling at Marad
Beach. It is conceded that on the date of incident, there were only 13
Policemen on duty at Marad, one among them being a Head Constable
(AW2S). AW2S conceded that he was the Senior most officer on duty at
Marad Beach on the crucial day, others being 12 constable of whom,
inspite of the specific direction given by AW29 to have atleast one local
PC in each of the (9) picket post, 11 were from the A.R.Camp. In other
words for all the 9 picket-posts at Marad, these was only one local P.C.
I remember that AW29 had issued specific direction vide; Ext.AlOS to
post atleast one local P C. in each picket post since that was required
for effective .policing as the A.R. men are meant only for
reinforcement. But, the number of local P.C. available at Marad on the
crucial day was only one. AW29 issued the instructions as per Ext.AlOS
after his visit to Marad Beach on 24-8-2002. Going by Ext.FI7, the
Chart produced by the F party showing the deployment of Police at.
Marad Beach, there was only one local P.C. posted in the entire Marad
Beach from 7-1-2003 till 30-4-2003 (one local P C, each day). That
Chart says that on 2-5-2003, there were 13 local PC. -in Marad Beach.
But, evidence revealed and it is also admitted that there was only one
local PC. there, on 2-5-2003 (on 21-1-2003, there were three local P Cs.
on 1 2-2003, 20-2-2003, 1-3-2003 and 26-3-2003 there were two local P
Cs. . But never after ? 1-7003. there were one local PC. each atleast, in
each of the 9 pickets as directed by AW 29) Ext. F29 shows that on 2-5-
2003, there ' was only one local HC and one local PC in the Marad
Control Room, one ARPC each in six (6) pickets and two (2) ARPC

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each, in 3 pickets. According to AW25 the PCs from the AR Camp had
only experience. Apart from AW29, there was only one constable in the
Control Room (at Marad) The evidence of AW2S shows that even those
Policemen could do nothing worth the name at the time of the massacre,
except saving themselves. As against the claim of AW32 regarding the
weaponry made available at Marad, only one 303 rifle, few tear gas
shells and few lathees were provided in the Control Room for them. At
the time of massacre, there was not a single gun in the Marad Control
Room or picket post, as per the version of AW25. There were only few
tear gas shells and lathees. Even that, those poor policemen could no
effectively use, going by the words v of AW2S and FW2 because they
did not have the mental make up to do that on a charged situation.
Though, AW27, 28 and AW 30 suggested in specific terms and AW29
issued direction to increase the police strength at Marad Beach, it is
revealed from the oral evidence and Ext.Fl? that the strength was being
scaled down day by day, and on the crucial day, there were only 13
Police men for the entire Marad Beach: It is also revealed from Ext F17
that for several days before 2-5-03, senior police officers above H.C.
were not available at Marad Beach.

33. It is true that vide Ext.S6, FW2 had requested for further
reinforcement. He requested the Commissioner, Calicut (AW32) to
allot more policemen. He had also asked for providing infrastructure for
the Police. Concededly; that was not complied. Instead, AW32 asked
FW2 to take reinforcement if any, from his own sub division which had
strength of about 400 men. There could not be a defence that the
Policemen posted at Marad Beach were not effective because of lack of
infrastructure - a paramilitary force cannot take up that plea. If, FW2
thought that more Policemen were needed by the situation at Marad, he
should have managed it from his own sub division even if AW32 had

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denied further force rightly or wrongly. Certainly, AW32 should have
alerted himself about the situation on getting the request for more men.
But FW2 could not plead that because AW32 did not grant the request
for more men, he did not provide more men at Marad Beach. FW2 did
not reply to Ext. S7 dt. 2-9-02 that he had no sufficient men at his
command for deployment at Marad. The issue was left there. Both AW
32 and FW2 were equally- negligent or irresponsible in the discharge of
their duties in that regard. The chart (Ext.Fl?) produced by the City
Police administration revealed that on the prior dates, there were bit
more strength at Marad Beach than the skeletal strength on - 2-5-2003.
Going by the evidence of FW4, even the strength at Beypore PS. on 2-
5-2003 was not sufficient to meet an urgent situation. Certainly,
circumstances indicated lethargic attitude on the part of AW32 and
FW2. and the local police.

34. It is strange to note that the wireless set allotted to the Police at
Marad beach was kept in the house of one Rukubi, with the possibility
of secret information leaking out through the inmates of the house.
AW28 specifically informed the urgent need to shift the wireless set
from that house, but nothing happened till 2-5-2003. Very effective
policing indeed, at Marad Beach!

35. Regarding the altercation between the two Muslim groups in front of
the Juma. Masjid at Marad Beach few weeks before 21-3-2003, I
adverted to the evidence of AW5. AW6 and AW30. FW2 denied that
there was any discussion on that matter in the meeting of the
'Kadalkodathi' on 21-3-2003. But, I find that the denial is not
trustworthy. Ext.FS is the minutes of the 'Kadalkodathi' meetings. FW2
took charge on 17 — 2002 and since then, there were 7 (seven) sittings -
of Kadalkodathi until 21-3-2003 (FW2 took part only in 3 sitting viz. on

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11-7-7002. 19-8-2002 and 21-3-2003). Resolution No.l taken in the
meeting on 21.-3-2003 is that people should not jump into conclusions
based on rumours, they should act only after ascertaining the truth of
such rumours and that if at all there were any problem between the two
communities, the members of the two communities must discuss and
settle it. Certainly, resolution No. 1 referring to the 'rumour' indicated
that apprehension was raised by the: - members in the 'kadalkodathi'
regarding violence. What else could be that 'rumour'?. FW2 was not
able to give a proper explanation as to what prompted the
'Kadalkodathi' to adopt that decision. AW30 has given evidence that
the issue of retaliation and the consequent wordy altercation came up
for consideration in the Kadalkodathi meeting on 21-3-2003. According
to FW4, the wordy altercation in front of the Mosque on 14-3-2003 was
regarding the administration of the Mosque! Thus, the Resolution No.l
in the meeting of the 'Kadalkodathi' on 21-3-2003 revealed by Ext.FS
supported the evidence of AWS, AW6 and AW30 regarding the
altercation between the two Muslim groups about retaliation, that being
brought to the notice of the local Police including , FW2 and their
ignoring the warning bell.

36. Evidence is given by BW2 and AW27 about physical training
classes conducted by certain organizations even in the night at Marad
Beach: According to BW2, the; Muslim youths alone attended those
classes taken by persons who came from outside Marad. But, the local
Police' had no idea about it. I remember that the SSB and AW29 had
alerted the local Police about certain Muslim fundamentalist elements
operating in, the area. That did not open the eyes of the local Police.

37. Evidence revealed that the conspiracy for the massacre started much
before 19-3-2003 (on which day, AW32 handed over charge). Evidence

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revealed that the local Police was quit inactive on the situation at Marad
following the communal riot on 3/4-1-2002. They did not act effectively
on the information given by the Intelligence Wing: The local ' Police
did not also effectively carry out the directions given by AW29 except,
that the Commissioner (AW32) directed FW2 to carry out the directions
and FW2 in turn, wrote down that direction in the visiting book of the
Beypore Police Station. The patrolling and search for weapons said to
be made by the local police were not effective or purposeful. To put it
shortly, the local Police was lethargic in their attitude towards the
situation at Marad Beach. According to FW6, Sri: T.K. Vinod Kumar,
the Commissioner of Police, Kozhikode from 31-3-2003, even the
relevant Intelligence reports were not shown to him by his office staff
after he assumed charge on 31-3-2003. Even AW32 had to concede that
the local police had no tight grip on the situation at Marad Beach, but
according to him, that tight grip was lost after he vacated office of the
Commissioner on 19-3-2003. It is difficult to think that the " tight grip"
loosened after 19-3-2003. Even going by Ext. S 1 , the assailants had
planned to strike one month before 2-5-2003 but that attempt aborted
only because the news some how leaked out. The evidence , facts and
circumstances revealed that the City Police Administration failed in
taking effective steps to prevent the massacre at Marad Beach on 2-5-
2003.

38. As regards the action taken (by the local Police) to prevent
spreading of violence after the massacre on 2- 5-2003, I stated at the
beginning of this Chapter that here was no dispute that the local Police
under FW6 Sri. T.K. Vinod Kumar did a commendable job.

39. Some of the B parties have a complaint that there was wide spread
.looting and damage to the houses " of the Muslims who fled from the

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beach following the massacre on 2-5-2003. According to them, the State
Government succumbed to the pressure of the Hindu fascist /
fundamentalist elements. The Government did not take any effective
action against the provocative speeches made by some of the Hindu
leaders including Sri. Praveen Togadia at Kozhikode, following the
massacre on 2-5-2003. They also say that the Government was
succumbing to the pressure of the Hindu fascist / fundamentalist
elements by not ordering rehabilitation.

40. It has come in evidence that there was a large contigent of police at
Marad Beach following the massacre on 2-5-2003. House ,hold articles
were damaged on the days after the massacre on 2-5-2003. One can
certainly understand the ire of the relatives of those killed in the
massacre on 2-5-2003 and the charged situation but certainly, that could
not extend to wide spread damaging of the houses or house hold articles.
The police was duty bound to prevent that, which they did not. That
conduct of the Police cannot be appreciated.

41. As regards the delay in rehabilitation, the evidence goes to show
that the Hindu organizations refused to cooperate with their demanding
C.B.I, investigation into the massacre and it is only when the
Government agreed to look into that matter atleast concerning the
alleged involvement of other forces in the massacre on getting the legal
opinion of the Advocate General, that the Hindu oranization agreed for
rehabilitation. There was delay in the rehabilitation. DWl, the then
Chief Minister was of the view that rehabilitation could not be imposed
on a section of the people of Marad by force and that the attempt of
the Government was to find out amicable settlement, rather than again
paving the way for blood shed. After consideration of the matter, the
Commission is inclined to agree with that -view of DWl.

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42. The above discussion leads the Commission to the conclusion that
there was only a symbolic presence of the police at Marad Beach on 2-
5-2003 and even on several days before that. The Civil Administration
by initiating some relief measures immediately after 3/4-1-2002, only
indicated the symbolic presence of the State machinery. There were
lapses on the part of the police and Civil Administration, Kozhikode iri
taking timely, , preventive remedial action in preventing the massacre at
Marad Beach, on 2-5-2003. But, the local Police acted effectively under
the then Commissioner, Sri. T.K. Vinod Kumar in preventing the
spreading of violence following that massacre though, it was
unfortunate that household articles were damaged at Marad Beach in the
presence of the police after the massacre on 2-5-2003.

THOMAS P JOSEPH
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

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